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Abstract 
Economic development implies that the efficiency of firms in developing countries is 
approaching that of firms in advanced economies. We examine the extent of this convergence in 
the Czech Republic and Russia, economies that represent alternative models of implementing 
development policies, often referred to as the Washington Consensus, that have promoted 
privatization, competition and foreign investment.  We also test hypotheses positing that only 
firms near the efficiency frontier benefit from these policies and catch up.  Using 1992-2000 
panel data on virtually all industrial firms in each country, we find that privatization to domestic 
owners did not markedly improve the efficiency of firms; domestic firms are not catching up to 
the (world) efficiency standard given by foreign-owned firms; and the distance of the Russian 
firms to the efficiency frontier is much larger than that of the Czech firms and continued to grow 
for most firms beyond 1997 while remaining constant in the Czech Republic.  Domestic firms 
closer to the frontier are not more likely to catch up than firms further from the frontier although 
foreign firms do exhibit this behavior.  Foreign-owned firms are increasingly displacing 
domestic firms in the top deciles of the overall distribution of efficiency, due in part to slower 
“learning” by domestic firms, higher efficiency of foreign startups, and foreigners’ acquisitions 
of more efficient domestic firms.  The two alternative implementations of the Washington 
Consensus policies have thus not enabled domestic firms to start catching up to the world 
standard. 
JEL classification: C33, D20, G32, L20 
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1. Introduction 
Economic development implies that the efficiency of firms in developing countries 
should be approaching the efficiency of firms in advanced economies.  This aspect of 
development becomes especially relevant as globalization proceeds and greater openness to 
commodity and factor flows induces more intense worldwide competition.  The development 
policies pursued over the last two decades by many governments under the influence of the 
international policy community, often referred to as the “Washington Consensus,” have tried to 
increase efficiency in developing countries and reduce the gap between the poor and rich 
economies by pursuing a number of key reforms, including privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), stimulating the entry of new firms, encouraging foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and trade, and assisting with institutional development.  Given the depth and breadth of 
initial distortions and subsequent reforms in the transition economies, one may expect the 
positive effects of globalization and market-oriented policies to be larger and hence more 
detectable in these countries than in other developing economies.  In this paper we examine 
whether the Washington Consensus policies have propelled domestic firms in transition 
economies to converge to the world standard.
1  
The Washington Consensus has been subject to debate.  One group of critics argues that 
these policies have not contributed to the convergence process and that excessively rapid 
privatization and other measures account for the relatively poor performance of the former 
Soviet bloc countries in the early phase of the transition (e.g., Stiglitz, 1999).  Other critics 
proclaim that the problems of the less successful transition economies have been brought about 
by insufficiently rapid and comprehensive policies (e.g., Sachs, 1996).  A nuanced view is 
embedded in the recent theoretical arguments that an increase in competition encourages 
innovative behavior of firms that are near the technological frontier but stifles those that lag 
significantly behind (Aghion et al., 2002 and 2003; Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2002 and 
2003).  We test this “proximity to the frontier” proposition, which implies that the Washington 
Consensus policies stimulate more efficient domestic firms to converge, but are too 
                                                 
1 The Washington consensus policies reflected ideas that were widely held in Washington in the late 1980s and were 
guided primarily by the perception of what was desirable for Latin America (see e.g., Williamson, 2000). However, 
they were also widely implemented in other parts of the world, including the transition economies (see e.g., Svejnar 
2002). In addition to the firm-level oriented policies discussed above, the Consensus contained macro prescriptions 
such as fiscal and monetary discipline and maintaining a competitive exchange rate.   2
overwhelming and cause divergence (or outright failure) on the part of the less efficient domestic 
firms.
2   
At the micro level, as better firm-level data come on stream, there is a growing literature 
questioning whether privatized firms have been more productive than SOEs and whether foreign 
ownership improves efficiency in the emerging market economies.  There is evidence that firms 
with foreign ownership are more productive than domestic firms (e.g., Terrell and Svejnar, 1989; 
Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Djankov et al., 2002; and Smarzynska, 2004).  However, surveys 
disagree about the effects of privatization on performance, ranging from those that find no or 
limited systematic effect (e.g., Bevan, Estrin, and Schaffer, 1999; Hanousek, Kocenda, and 
Svejnar, 2004), to cautiously concluding that privatization around the world improves firm 
performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001), to being fairly confident that privatization does 
indeed improve performance (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Shirley and Walsh, 2000).
3  T h e  
literature raises the issue of whether the effect of privatization is conditioned by factors such as 
competition (e.g., Brown and Earle, 2001; Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright, 2004) and institutions 
such as the legal environment (e.g., Fox and Heller, 2000; Frydman et al., 1999).  Indeed, some 
argue that the policies of the Washington Consensus failed because of a lack of institutional 
development (Williamson, 2000). 
We examine the evolution of efficiency of industrial firms in two alternative prototypes 
of transition economies – the Czech Republic and Russia.  These two countries provide excellent 
laboratories because they maintained central planning and virtually no private ownership and 
FDI inflows until the start of the transition,
4 both rapidly privatized most state assets, and yet 
they otherwise pursued very different paths in implementing the Washington Consensus policies.  
The Czech Republic represents the Central and East European (CEE) model, which emphasizes 
the opening up to trade and capital flows, developing a functioning market economy and 
gradually establishing institutions, rules and regulations that make a country eligible for 
accession to the European Union.  Russia is a model of the countries in the Commonwealth of 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, over two decades ago the converse of this hypothesis was proposed by Findlay (1978, p. 2) who 
posits that “the rate of technological progress in relatively ‘backward’ region is an increasing function of the gap 
between its own level of technology and that of the ‘advanced’ region which improves at a constant rate, and the 
degree to which it is open to direct foreign investment.”  See Kosova (2004) for a review. 
3 See Roland (2000) for a theoretical analysis and overview of privatization in transition. 
4 See Ericson (1991) for a description of an intact Soviet model.  Many other transition economies do not represent 
equally clear-cut shifts of regime.  Hungary and Poland for instance introduced important reforms already under   3
Independent States (CIS), which have remained more closed to world trade and FDI, and have 
changed their laws, regulations and institutions more slowly and without attempting to 
harmonize them with those of the European Union.
5  
The potential disadvantage of using the Czech Republic and Russia as prototype 
economies for the two models of transition and development is that they both selected rapid mass 
privatizations and may have therefore had inferior performance and hence not representative to 
otherwise similar countries.  The only way to address this conjecture would be to carry out our 
tests on firm-level data from these other economies.  However, we do not have access to 
comparable micro data in these other countries.  But, we can significantly alleviate this concern 
by showing that the evolution of overall productivity in manufacturing in the 1990s and early 
2000s was not very different in the Czech Republic and the other CEE economies.  In particular, 
between 1993 and 2000, the average annual rate of productivity increase in manufacturing, 
calculated from EBRD (1999, 2003) data, was 8.01% for the Czech Republic, 8.76% for 
Hungary, 9.57% for Poland, 6.07% for Slovakia and 7.23% for Slovenia.  We can also show that 
the change in Russian productivity was very different from the CEE countries at only 1.5%.
6  
(The Russian average is greatly affected by a 17.7% decrease in 1993-94; the 1994-2000 average 
annual increase in productivity was 4.7%.)  As these productivity data indicate, the Czech 
Republic is not an outlier relative to other CEE countries – in fact, it is right in the middle of the 
pack.  Russia productivity growth is obviously in a different category, as are probably the other 
CIS countries on which we do not have data.  Finally, as we show presently, we check for the 
possible influence of a particular type of privatization schemes by carrying out our analysis for 
periods immediately as well as several years after mass privatization, thus allowing for 
reallocation of ownership to take place and different patterns of performance to show over time. 
Our approach for assessing whether domestic firms have been catching up to world 
standards is to estimate and compare changes in the levels of productive efficiency over the 
1992-2000 period for foreign-owned firms and three types of domestic firms (SOEs, private 
                                                                                                                                                             
communism and hence operated with less tight central planning, significant private ownership and, especially in 
Hungary, FDI. 
5 For example, in 1997 the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey carried out by the World 
Bank and the EBRD found that 40.1% of the sample in the Czech Republic, as compared to only 20.8% in Russia 
believed that the legal system would uphold contract and property rights.   
   4
domestic firms and firms with mixed ownership).  We use the estimated efficiency of foreign-
owned firms as the benchmark since by the mid-1990s these firms were well established in all 
the major sectors of the two economies and it is therefore likely that the best ones were operating 
at the world standard.  This choice also reflects Helpman and Melitz’s (2004) finding that it is 
the most efficient firms in advanced economies that establish subsidiaries in other countries.  
Moreover, using foreign-owned firms as proxies for the world standard is superior to using firms 
operating in advanced market economies since the latter approach is plagued by problems related 
to different institutions and shocks in the advanced vs. transition economies, as well as major 
problems related to the wide exchange rate fluctuations and other conversion problems. 
Our findings are derived from estimating translog production functions on panel data 
from medium and large industrial firms in the two economies.  The data are drawn from the 
Registries of Industrial Enterprises of the Russian Statistical Office and the Czech Statistical 
Office.  Whereas most studies of privatization in transition economies have been hampered by 
small data sets with observations concentrated immediately before and after privatization, our 
samples approach the populations of large and medium-sized industrial enterprises in each 
country and cover the period of 1985-2000.  We analyze the period 1992-2000 after mass 
privatization took off in both countries, but we exploit the earlier data in constructing 
instrumental variables (IVs). 
We first estimate the average level of productive efficiency in firms with the four 
different types of ownership, both for the entire 1992-2000 period and three sub-periods 
characterizing the early (1992-94), middle (1995-97) and mature (1998-2000) transition.  We 
check the robustness of our results by using ordinary least squares (OLS), median quantile 
regression (QREG), random effects (RE), fixed effects (FE), two stage least squares random 
effects estimator (2SLS-RE), and a Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (BB).  The estimates 
are broadly similar across these methods and they lead us to conclude that in both countries the 
efficiency of the private and mixed firms is on average similar to that of the SOEs, and hence 
that privatization to domestic owners did not have its intended efficiency-enhancing effect during 
the first post-privatization decade.  Moreover, the estimates show that the three types of domestic 
firms are not catching up to the world standard given by the efficiency of the foreign-owned 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 The relative position of the Czech Republic is similar in the early part of the 1993-2000 period, when it received 
much less FDI per capita than Hungary, and the later part of the period, when it was one of the leading recipients of 
FDI.   5
firms. In the Czech Republic the gap between the efficiency of these three types of domestic 
firms and the world standard is smaller than in Russia and it ceases to increase after 1997, 
whereas in Russia the domestic firms continue to fall behind after 1997, albeit slightly.  
We next examine the efficiency gap between foreign and domestic firms at different 
points in their distributions of efficiency in order to establish whether the average results hold 
throughout the distribution.  We find that the relationship between state, private and mixed firms 
remains similar throughout the distribution and over time, but that the gap is much larger 
between the best foreign and best domestic firms than between the worst foreign and worst 
domestic firms.  The average results hence understate the gap at the top and overstate it at the 
bottom of the distribution. 
Finally, we address the question as to whether domestic firms are moving closer to an 
efficiency frontier, defined the efficiency of the best foreign firms in a two digit industrial 
classification.  We show that neither the more nor the less efficient domestic firms have been 
reducing their distance to the frontier over the 1992-2000 period. Perhaps most striking is the 
finding that foreign firms are increasingly displacing domestic firms in the upper tail of the 
overall efficiency distribution. 
In Section 3 we explore whether our findings are being driven by different starting 
conditions or by changes in the learning behavior of firms by ownership type.  In other words, 
are foreign firms entering at a higher level of efficiency than domestic firms or do they increase 
their efficiency faster than domestic firms over time?  We find that foreign startups are more 
efficient than domestic ones, which in turn are more efficient than existing domestic firms.  We 
also find that when foreign firms use acquisition as a form of entry, they tend to acquire more 
efficient domestic firms, although the economic effect of this statistically significant result is 
limited.   With respect to learning behavior, we show that on average domestic firms are 
improving their efficiency more slowly than foreign firms.  Finally, except for the foreign owned 
firms, we do not find support for the hypothesis that firms closer to the efficiency frontier are 
increasing their efficiency at a faster rate than those farther behind the frontier.   
The above results are buttressed by our estimates of conditional (β) convergence within 
ownership-specific distributions of productive efficiency (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  In 
particular, we find that while all four types of firms show signs of convergence (with foreign 
firms in Russia converging faster), the foreign owned firms converge to a higher steady state   6
value of efficiency than the three types of domestic firms.  Overall, our results bring into 
question the expected benefits of privatization and FDI for the development of domestically 
owned firms. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we present our estimation strategy, data, 
and findings on the evolution of efficiency by ownership.  In Section 3 we explore the factors 
that may explain the patterns found in Section 2.  We draw conclusions in Section 4. 
2. Evolution of Efficiency by Ownership 
In this section, we establish basic stylized facts.  First, we estimate the average efficiency 
level of firms by ownership type over the entire 1992-2000 period and for the three sub-periods.  
Second, we investigate what patterns hold at various points in the ownership-specific efficiency 
distributions.  Third, we examine the level and evolution of the distance of firms to the efficiency 
frontier.  Fourth, we assess if foreign firms displace domestic firms in the upper deciles of the 
overall efficiency distribution.   
2.1. The Central Tendency 
Estimating the average efficiency levels is a useful starting point that makes our analysis 
comparable to most studies of productive efficiency.
7  We report estimates from a translog 
production function which in our data statistically dominates more restrictive functional forms: 
it i t it
it ilt ikt kl l k ikt k k it
v T I
Z x x x y
ε ς δ
ρ γ β β
+ + + +
+ ∑ ∑ + ∑ + = ln ln
2
1
ln ln 0
  (
1) 
where yit represents the output (revenue) of firm i in period t, x's represent inputs, Zit is a vector 
of categories of ownership, the I's and T’s denote a set of dummy variables for industries and 
years, respectively, vi are unobserved time-invariant firm-specific effects, and εit is an 
independently distributed error term.  The specification allows productive efficiency to vary 
across types of ownership, industries, and time.
8 
                                                 
7 See e.g., Djankov and Murrell (2002) for a survey of the production function literature in the transition economies.  
8 In addition to the standard variables for the translog production function, we include several variables to control for 
special features of our data.  Dummy variables were created for observations with a change in capital stock that was 
obviously too large (or too small) for the corresponding change in output or in employment.  For Russia, two 
additional variables are included: i) an interaction term between a dummy for year 1992 and state ownership and ii)   7
We estimate equation (1) with 1992-2000 panel data on nearly the entire population of 
large- and medium-sized industrial firms in the Czech Republic and Russia.  Our samples are 
comprised of industrial firms that have more than 100 employees in any year during the 1985-
2000 period since the data on smaller firms is not representative over this period. Our estimates 
are based on data for 1,537 to 2,970 firms a year in the Czech Republic and 15,035 to 19,209 
firms in a given year in Russia.  In the Czech Republic, employment in these firms covers 
between 86% and 100% of total employment in enterprises with more than 100 employees.  The 
Russian sample represents between 70% and 94% of total employment outside of the legally 
defined small enterprises (see Appendix 1 for definitions of small enterprises).   The two data 
sets are comparable in terms of their sample construction and variable definition.  In the 
Appendix we provide a detailed description of the data sources and data cleaning process 
(Appendix 1), sample construction (Table A1), definitions of the variables (Table A2), and 
summary statistics (Table A3).   
For our dependent variable we use the real “value of production net of tax,” with 
industry-specific producer price indices being used as deflators.
9 For capital, we use the average 
nominal value of fixed assets for a given year, with annual time dummy variables serving as a 
capital goods deflator.  The labor variable is the average number of full-time equivalent workers 
in a given year.  Whereas in the Czech Republic the number of workers is explicitly adjusted for 
an eight-hour day, in Russia a partial adjustment is made for contracted part-time workers and all 
other workers are given a weight of one. The industry categories are made comparable between 
the two countries by recoding 5-digit OKONKh Russian Classification of Industries and 2-digit 
NACE Czech Industry Classification into 2-digit ISIC codes. 
We use the following four categories of firm ownership:  private (domestically owned); 
state (federal, regional and municipal); mixed; and foreign.  In Russia, the ownership categories 
are based on 100% ownership, except for foreign ownership, where firms with any foreign 
                                                                                                                                                             
an interaction term between a dummy for year 1992 and the log of capital.  The former variable is added because 
ownership is not available in 1992 and we assume state ownership for all firms in this year given that large-scale 
privatization in Russia started only at the end of 1992.  The latter variable was necessary because 1992 was 
problematic in terms of accurate measures of capital in Russia since it was the first year of high inflation and the 
proper end-year capital re-valuation began only in 1993. 
9 In using output rather than value added (which we do not have), we implicitly assume that material inputs vary in 
proportion to labor or capital. We also capture fixed differences between output and value added across industries by 
including industry-specific dummy variables as regressors. For Russia, where we can check the sensitivity of our 
results to different industrial aggregation, we find than the basic results are similar for two- and four-digit industrial 
classification.   8
ownership are classified as foreign.  In the Czech Republic, ownership categories, including 
foreign, are based on more than 50% ownership.  Hence, in the Czech Republic the category of 
mixed ownership includes firms in which no single type of owners has more than a 50% stake, 
while in Russia, the mixed category includes firms with no foreign ownership and no single type 
of domestic owner with 100% ownership.  Mixed ownership in Russia therefore includes firms 
with much more concentrated ownership than in the Czech Republic.  Moreover, in the Czech 
Republic firms classified as foreign are majority foreign-owned, while in Russia they may have 
only a small foreign ownership stake.  Finally, unlike in Russia, in the Czech Republic firms 
with mixed ownership may have significant minority ownership by foreign investors. 
As may be seen from Table 1, both countries display a pattern of declining state and 
rising private ownership during the 1990s in terms of shares of firms, employment or output.  
Where they differ is in the relative share with foreign ownership, which is much smaller in 
Russia, despite the more inclusive definition of this category in Russia than in the Czech 
Republic.  For example, the Russian share of foreign firms in 2000 is about one-fifth of the share 
in the Czech Republic.  In both countries the average foreign firm is larger and more productive 
than the average domestic firm. 
As with any production function estimation, endogeneity is an important issue.  The 
complication in our case is that the common problem of input endogeneity is entwined with the 
potential correlation between ownership types and the unobserved firm-specific productivity.  
Rewrite equation (1) in a vector form as 
it i it it it v Z X y ε ρ β + + + = ln ,
  (
2) 
where X is a vector of inputs and dummy variables for industry and years, Z is a vector of 
categories of ownership, and E(vi) = E(εit) = E(viεit) = E(εitεis) = 0 for ∀ t > s.  The unobserved 
firm-specific productivity could determine the type of ownership by influencing the 
governments’ decisions to privatize or investors’ decisions to acquire the firm.  Potential 
domestic and foreign owners may also respond to past productivity shocks.  Thus, ownership 
enters equation (2) as a “predetermined variable” that may be correlated with past shocks (εis) 
and with firm-specific unobservables (vi) but not correlated with present errors, that is E(Zitεis) ≠ 
0 for ∀  t > s, E(Zitvi) ≠ 0, and E(Zitεit) = 0.   9
Under these conditions, the OLS and RE estimators may be biased and inconsistent.  The 
FE and first difference estimators allow for the correlation of Zit with vi but aggravate the 
measurement error by increasing the noise-to-true signal ratio (e.g., Griliches and Hausman, 
1986), thus often leading to zero ownership effects.
10  In addition, first differencing equation 
makes ownership endogenous as E(Zitεi-1) ≠ 0 leads to E(Zit-Zit-1, εit-εit-1) ≠ 0. 
To address the endogeneity of inputs, several treatment methods have been proposed, 
including the Blundell-Bond (BB) system GMM estimator (2000), the Olley-Pakes investment 
proxy estimator (1996) and the Levinsohn-Petrin intermediate input proxy estimator (2003), 
among others.
11  None of these methods, however, deals directly with the problem of 
endogeneity in ownership.  Mainly because of the lack of valid instruments, the common practice 
in the privatization literature has been to use OLS, RE or FE estimators. 
Our data allow us to go further in treating the potential endogeneity of ownership since 
we can exploit the fact that we have information on the firms’ supervisory ministries under 
central planning.  The individual ministries were historically in charge of specific SOEs and 
were central in determining which ones were privatized as well as the extent and nature of 
privatization (foreign, mixed or domestic).  The ministries were typically quite independent of 
one another and in Russia they also operated at different levels of government (federal, regional 
and municipal).  As a result, their privatization decisions were fairly idiosyncratic (e.g., some 
were motivated more by revenue maximization and others by employment maximization at the 
local level).  With the regime change in the early 1990s the ministries rapidly lost control over 
many activities of the firms in their jurisdiction and were no longer as informed about their 
activities. In particular, they were no longer able to give binding orders, transfer resources and 
obtain detailed information about the performance of the firms in the rapidly changing 
environment.  As we show below, the ministry dummy variables are very good IVs for 
                                                 
10 The measurement error problem is especially severe for variables with little variation over time.  Since we have a 
significant number of firms for which we do not observe ownership changes (65.6% of firms in the Czech Republic 
and 46.1% in Russia) and only few firms where we observe ownership changing more than once during 1992-2000 
(8.5% in the Czech Republic and 13.4% in Russia), it is preferable not to rely too much on the FE or FD estimates.  
With limited observed changes in ownership, a small amount of measurement error in ownership classification may 
create a high noise to signal ratio.  We therefore treat the FE and FD estimates with caution.  RE estimates use 
within and cross sectional information and are hence less affected by this problem. 
11 We could not carry out the Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations in Russia since we do not have data on 
investment, materials, or energy inputs.  In the Czech data, where we have information on investment and materials, 
the Levinsohn-Petrin estimates come close to those of Blundell and Bond.   10
ownership since they are fine predictors of the ownership variables and they are not correlated 
with the relative levels of productivity of the enterprise.
12 
We use information on the supervisory ministries in two approaches for treating 
endogeneity of ownership. In the 2SLS-RE estimator, we use ministry categories and one-year 
lagged X’s and Z’s to estimate a binary (probit) ownership model for each ownership type: 
( ) ( ) M Z X G M Z X Z t t j t t
j
t , 1 1 , 1 1 , , | 1 P − − − − = = ,
  (
3) 
where j denotes the ownership type and M a vector of ministry categories.  We use the fitted 
probabilities from the probit, ij G ˆ , as instruments for ownership categories.  The F-test values of 
the ministry dummies in the first stage equation are high (well above 100) indicating that they 
are important in predicting the ownership category.  The predicted probabilities have several 
useful properties as instruments for binary endogenous variables – the IV estimator is 
asymptotically efficient, the fitted probabilities stay within the [0,1] range, and the first stage 
equation need not be correctly specified (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). 
Our second approach is to treat ownership as a predetermined variable in a static BB 
estimation.  This implies that not only inputs but also ownership variables in first differences are 
instrumented with lags of their own levels, and inputs and ownership in levels are instrumented 
with lags of their own first differences.  In addition, ministries under central planning are 
included in the BB estimation as instruments for all endogenous variables.  In both approaches, 
the Hausman test rejects OLS in favor of the IV estimates. 
The estimates of average differences in productive efficiency by ownership (private, 
mixed and foreign firms relative to the SOEs, the base
13) for the Czech Republic and Russia 
during 1992-2000 are reported in Table 2.
14  In order to assess the robustness of our results, we 
                                                 
12 The correlations between industry dummies in the Xit vector of regressors and the ministry dummies identifying the 
effect of ownership variables are low.  In Russia, for instance, firms in the same industry reported to different ministries 
at the federal, regional, and municipal levels. 
13 Note that the number of SOEs decreases over time but remains sufficiently large to be usable as a base category. 
This permits us to avoid the inconvenience of switching the base over time and forcing the reader to reinterpret the 
results accordingly.  Using the SOEs as a base is also appealing conceptually since state ownership constitutes the 
original category from which most firms evolved and to which one wants to compare the alternatives. 
14 The complete sets of OLS and RE translog coefficients are presented in Appendix Table A4.  The ownership 
effects do not change substantially when we constrain the translog production function to have constant returns to 
scale.   11
report coefficients from pooled OLS, QREG, RE, FE, 2SLS-RE, and BB estimations.  All six 
methods yield the same pattern of key results:  First, firms with foreign ownership are found to 
be significantly more efficient than the SOEs, with their relative efficiency premium varying 
from 27.5 to 65.7 log points (31.7% to 92.9%) in the Czech Republic and 17.6 to 99.4 log points 
(19.2% to 170.2%) in Russia.  The true efficiency differences are likely to be above the fixed 
effects estimates, which are the most affected by the measurement-error-driven attenuation bias. 
This suggests that the foreign-SOE efficiency differential is much greater in Russia than the 
Czech Republic. 
Second, firms with foreign ownership are on average much more efficient than both 
domestic private firms and firms with mixed ownership.
15 
Third, within each country the private and mixed firms generate similar efficiency 
coefficients in most estimates.  In the Czech Republic, these two types of firms are found to be 
approximately 10% more efficient than the SOEs, while in Russia the pooled OLS, QREG, and 
BB estimates suggest that these firms are somewhat more efficient than the SOEs, but the RE, 
FE, and 2SLS-RE coefficients point to the contrary. 
In Table 3 we report coefficients of the production function estimated separately for 
1992-94, 1995-97 and 1998-2000, which allows both the production technology and efficiency 
effects of different types of ownership to change over the three periods.  In Russia, all methods 
suggest that the efficiency gap between foreign and domestic (state, private, and mixed) 
ownership increased over the three periods, but the increase appears to be more pronounced in 
the first than the second half of the transition period.  For the Czech Republic, the results are 
more mixed: the foreign-state efficiency gap did not change much over the three sub-periods 
according to the RE and 2SLS-RE estimates, while the pooled OLS and QREG estimates 
indicate that there was an increase in this gap between 1992-94 and 1995-97, but no significant 
increase between 1995-97 and 1998-2000.  Regarding the efficiency gap between foreign and 
mixed ownership, all four estimations indicate there is an increase between 1992-94 and 1995-97 
in firms but less thereafter, while the foreign-private differential appears to be relatively constant 
across the three periods. 
                                                 
15 The differences in coefficients are statistically significant at 1% test level.   12
2.2. The Best and the Worst 
In order to understand whether the more efficient local firms are catching up to and less 
efficient firms falling behind the world standard, one needs to look beyond the average 
performance and consider the distributions of efficiency of firms by ownership type.  We start in 
this section by comparing firms at corresponding percentiles of their efficiency distributions in 
order to assess how the best (and worst) firms in each ownership category compare with each 
other.  We define the best (worst) firms as those in the upper (lower) quartile or decile of the 
distribution of productive efficiency in their specific ownership type.  The question is whether 
the patterns for the average results hold across the distribution. 
We carry out two estimations comparing firms with different types of ownership at 
various points of the efficiency distribution.  First, we estimate a series of quantile regressions of 
the form 
[] θ θ θ ρ β it it it it it Z X Z X y Q + = , | ln ,
  (
4) 
where Qθ is the θ
th quantile of ln yit
 conditional on the covariates X and Z.  The estimated 
coefficients ρθ  give the relative efficiency of firms with different ownership at the θ
th quantile.  
The quantile approach provides a flexible estimation of all coefficients at different levels of 
efficiency.  
A potential drawback of the quantile estimates is that they do not control for firm-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity.  As a result, we also use the panel estimates of equation (2) and for 
each firm i we calculate firm-specific productive efficiency as  i i v + = ρ ϕ  for each ownership 
type, with E(ϕi) = ρ and E(vi) = 0.  The idiosyncratic errors (εit) are excluded from the measure 
of firm-specific productive efficiency in order to reduce the effect of transitory productivity 
shocks and statistical noise.  To allow for the variation in productive efficiency over time, the 
coefficients are estimated for each three-year panel. 
  The two approaches permit us to compare the efficiency of firms with different types of 
ownership at all points of the efficiency distribution, but they differ in their underlying 
constraints: the panel framework allows productive efficiency to vary across firms but constrains 
the production function coefficients to be identical for all firms, while the quantile approach   13
constrains productive efficiency to be the same for all firms in a given percentile of the 
distribution but permits the production function coefficients to vary across percentiles. 
The results of the quantile regressions, reported in Tables 4 and 5 (for the Czech Republic 
and Russia, respectively) as well as in Figure 1, allow us to compare the efficiency of foreign, 
domestic private, and mixed firms relative to the SOEs in the same percentiles of their respective 
efficiency distributions.
16  The tables and figure yield the following insights:  
i) Foreign firms are considerably more efficient than all three types of domestic firms at 
virtually all levels of the distribution of relative efficiency – from the best to the worst.
17  At the 
same time, the differences in the distributions of efficiency of the three types of domestic firms 
are relatively small, with mixed and private firms being 0-25% more efficient than state-owned 
firms at nearly every point of the distribution and in each of the three periods.   
ii) The gap between the efficiency of the foreign firms and all three types of domestic 
firms is greatest among the more efficient firms (75
th and 90
th percentiles) and smallest among 
the least efficient ones (10
th and 25
th percentiles).  An important exception is the foreign-state 
efficiency gap in the Czech Republic during the late transition period, when the relative 
efficiency of the worst (remaining) Czech SOEs actually drops and the foreign-state difference in 
efficiency becomes the greatest in the bottom decile (61.5 log points).
18  The fact that these 
inefficient SOEs did not go out of business is consistent with the finding of Lizal and Svejnar 
(2002) that the pattern of bank lending for investment pointed to important signs of soft budget 
constraints (bailouts) among the large and medium size Czech firms in the 1990s.  The large 
efficiency differentials that we find in Russia between firms with foreign ownership and all other 
firms are most likely also signs of the ongoing presence of soft budget constraints and limited 
competition.  This is consistent with Brown and Earle’s (2001) findings that in Russia 
competition did not lead to efficiency improvements unless the firm’s competitors were private 
or foreign. 
                                                 
16 For instance, foreign firms in the 10
th percentile of their efficiency distribution are compared to SOEs in the 10
th 
percentile of the efficiency distribution of the SOEs, etc. 
17 The exception is the foreign-mixed efficiency differential which is insignificant in the bottom decile in Russia and 
the bottom half of the distribution in the Czech Republic at the start of the transition (1992-94) and also in the 
bottom decile in the Czech Republic in mature transition (1998-2000).  In this context, it must be remembered that 
in the Czech Republic firms with mixed ownership include foreign firms with less than 50% ownership stake. 
18 The fact that in mature transition the remaining least efficient Czech SOEs were considerably less efficient than 
the other types of firms supports the Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (1999) models and findings suggesting that better 
firms were privatized first.   14
iii) As seen in Figure 1, the gap between the foreign and domestic firms in Russia is 
much larger than in the Czech Republic and the gap increases more rapidly from the worst to the 
best firms in Russia.  For example, in the first period in Russia the foreign-state difference in 
efficiency ranges from 13.4 log points (14.6%) in 10
th decile to 104.0 (183%) in the 90
th decile 
whereas in the Czech Republic the corresponding log points are 18.7 (20.6%) and 38.9 (47.6 %). 
iv) Using the estimates from Tables 4 and 5, we present in Table A5 the changes over 
time of the efficiency gap between foreign and domestic firms at selected percentiles of their 
efficiency distributions.  For both countries, the foreign-domestic gap experiences significant 
growth at virtually all points of the distribution from early to mid transition.
19  In Russia, the 
growth in the gap from mid to late transition continues to be positive but smaller than earlier (in 
the range of 10-20%) for the majority of firms but it stabilizes or even becomes negative for the 
most efficient firms.  In the Czech Republic, the change in the foreign-domestic gap is zero or 
negative (up to 16%) at all points of the distribution except for the less efficient SOEs.  As noted 
earlier, the latter result is probably due to soft budget constraints in poorly performing SOEs. 
The corresponding panel results, which take into account firm heterogeneity, are depicted 
in Figure 2.  The figure is constructed on the basis of the RE estimates of ϕi, but the FE and 
2SLS-RE estimates are highly correlated and do not alter our conclusions.
20  We order firms in 
each ownership category by ϕi and compare efficiency across ownership categories relative to 
the SOEs.  As may be seen from Figures 1 and 2, the patterns in relative efficiency obtained by 
the RE panel and quantile estimations are similar.  In the panel data approach, the gap between 
the foreign and domestic firms is larger in Russia than in the Czech Republic and it is greater 
among the more than the less efficient firms in all three periods.   
In sum, the average results overstate the gap at the bottom of the distribution and 
understate it at the top.  The gap grows in the first half of the transition in both countries, but 
much faster in Russia.  Between the second and third period the gap continues to grow (but more 
slowly) in Russia in all except the most efficient firms, while it stabilizes or shrinks for all firms 
except the least efficient SOEs in the Czech Republic. 
2.3. Distance to the Frontier 
                                                 
19 The exception is the growth in the foreign-private gap in the Czech Republic, which is positive but not statistically 
significant.  Otherwise, the percentage increase in the gap is about 15-20% for foreign-mixed and foreign-state in the 
Czech Republic and roughly 30-40% for all three foreign-domestic gaps in Russia.   15
Having examined the efficiency gaps on average and across the distributions, we next 
assess how far domestic firms are from the world technological frontier and how the distance 
changes over time.  We proxy the frontier by the average level of efficiency of the top one-third 
of the foreign firms in a given two-digit industry in each period.  The results are similar when we 
utilize four-digit industry and when we use other efficiency benchmarks (e.g., top 10%, top 50% 
or the average efficiency of foreign firms).
21  We define the (inverse) distance to the frontier as 
the ratio of each firm’s efficiency to the mean productive efficiency of the frontier foreign firms 
within a two-digit industry in each period.  As the ratio approaches 1 the firm approaches the 
frontier.  Since our measure of productive efficiency is in log form, we apply the following 
exponential transformation:  
( ) 66 . , | exp > − = θ ϕ ϕ α FOR k i i ,   (5) 
where αi is the firm-specific (inverse) measure of the distance to the frontier and  66 . , | > θ ϕ FOR k is 
the mean productive efficiency of the top third of foreign firms in industry k. 
In Figure 3 and Table 6 we show for each of the three time periods the distribution of the 
domestic firms’ distance to the frontier (αi).
22  Our findings are consistent with those in Section 
2.2 in that a) the distance of domestic firms from the frontier grows from 1992-94 to 1995-97 
and does not change much from 1995-97 to 1998-2000
23 and b) in every period domestic firms in 
Russia are much further away from the frontier than domestic firms in the Czech Republic at all 
points of the efficiency distribution.  In particular, three-quarters of Russian domestic firms 
operate at less than 30% of the frontier in the first period and at 20-25% of the frontier in the last 
period, while three-quarters of the Czech Republic’s firms operate at 60-70% of the frontier in 
the first period and 50-55% of the frontier in the last period.  Put differently, the Russian 
domestic firm at the 90
th percentile is at the same distance from the frontier as the median Czech 
domestic firm. 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 We show in appendix Table A6 that the various measures of ϕi are highly correlated. 
21 See appendix Table A7 for results obtained when the frontier is defined by the top 50% of the foreign firms in 
each industry vs. the top 10% or, the average of the foreign firms in the country.  The four digit estimates were 
obtained for Russia, where we have the finer industrial categories of data.  
22 We use RE estimates of productive efficiency to obtain our measure of the distance.  The results do not differ 
substantially from those obtained with FE or 2SLS-RE estimators. 
23 For example, in the Czech Republic SOEs at the 25
th percentile are at 32.5% of the frontier in 1992-94 but fall to 
24.1% in 1995-97 and 22.5% in 1998-2000.  In Russia, SOEs at the 25
th percentile fall from 11.4% to 6.1% and 
move up to 7.0% of the frontier over the same three periods.   16
Table 6 also makes it clear that the range of the efficiency distribution of foreign firms is 
much greater in Russia than in the Czech Republic.  For example, in the first period the foreign 
firm located at the 10
th percentile of the distribution has a level of efficiency that is at 29.1% of 
the frontier in the Czech Republic but only 7.8% of the frontier in Russia. At the 90
th percentile, 
the foreign firm in the Czech Republic is at 112.0 % of the frontier whereas the Russian foreign 
firm is at 130.9%.  What explains this greater dispersion in Russia?  Whereas part of the reason 
lies in the fact that the definition of the foreign firm in Russia is broader than in the Czech 
Republic, the greater dispersion probably also reflects the less competitive nature of the Russian 
economy.
24 
Finally, Figure 3 and Table 6 reveal considerable stability of the distribution of foreign 
firms relative to the frontier over time, while the distribution of domestic firms shifts away from 
the frontier in the early-to-mid transition.
25  These patterns are consistent with firms changing 
positions within the distribution, an issue that we examine in Section 3 below. 
2.4. Do Foreign Firms Crowd Out Domestic Firms? 
The next question that naturally arises is whether foreign firms are gradually replacing 
local firms at the top of the overall distribution of efficiency. Given our findings in Tables 1-6, 
one may expect that foreign firms will make up a larger share of firms at the top of the 
distribution as they increasingly enter each country.  In Figure 4 we depict the distribution of 
firms by ownership within the overall distribution of efficiency in each sub-period.
26  (The 
values of all shares are given in appendix Table A9.)  
In the early 1990s the Russian economy is composed mainly of SOEs (56.7% of all 
firms) and firms with mixed ownership (26.7%); whereas SOEs are disproportionately 
represented in the lowest two deciles of the distribution of efficiency, the mixed firms are 
disproportionately found in the upper half of the distribution.  As transition proceeds, the SOEs 
continue to be a larger share of the bottom two deciles and the mixed tend to be distributed 
evenly throughout the distribution.  Interestingly, the private firms also seem to be distributed 
                                                 
24 It is also possible that the larger gap in Russia is brought about by the fact that foreign firms are scarcer and 
presumably go after the most productive opportunities. We think that this is unlikely to be an important factor since 
we observe the differential even in the first period when foreign firms are scarce in both economies, and a similar 
pattern obtains in industries with a high and low share of foreign firms. 
25 In the Czech Republic there is a slight increase in the distance of foreign firms from the first to the second period 
but this increase is not as great as that of the domestic firms. 
26 We use random effects estimates of the average efficiency level of each firm within each three-year period.    17
fairly evenly across the ten deciles in all three periods.  In 1992-1994, the few foreign firms 
(1.4% of all firms) are disproportionately represented in the highest decile of the efficiency 
distribution (4.6%).  Over time as the share of foreign firms in the economy rises to 3.3% and 
4.9% in 1995-1997 and 1998-2000, respectively, their share in the top decile of the efficiency 
distribution rises even faster, to 14.3% and 21.8% in these respective time periods. 
In the Czech Republic there is already a substantial presence of foreign firms in the early 
1990s and they are disproportionately located in the top three deciles.  Over time, one observes a 
more marked penetration of foreign owned firms in the Czech Republic than in Russia, and their 
growing representation in the top three deciles of the efficiency distribution.  For example, in 
1998-2000 foreign firms represent 25.3% of all firms but 51.5% of firms in the top decile.  As 
state ownership withers away, private firms make up larger shares of the lower deciles and firms 
with mixed ownership move into the middle part of the distribution. 
In sum, in this section of the paper we carry out several tests of whether domestic firms 
approach the efficiency of foreign firms during the first decade of the transition.  Our findings 
suggest that the answer is a no in both countries, irrespective of whether we compare the central 
tendency, counterpart firms at various parts of their respective efficiency distributions, or firm-
specific distance to a frontier.  In fact, foreign firms are increasingly displacing local firms in the 
top deciles of the efficiency distribution.  
3.  Factors Affecting the Evolution in Relative Efficiency of Different Types of Firms 
In this section we examine factors that may drive the patterns in relative efficiency that 
we have identified in Section 2.  In particular, we focus on the efficiency of new firms (startups), 
efficiency of domestic firms that are acquired by foreign investors and the differential rates of 
learning by existing firms with different types of ownership. 
3.1. Startups 
We begin by asking whether foreign firms enter the market at a higher level of efficiency 
than the domestic firms.  If foreign startup operations have higher initial efficiency than domestic 
startups, then emerging market economies could achieve higher levels of efficiency by allowing 
these more efficient new foreign firms to enter.   
We first carry out a nonparametric test of the startup hypothesis by comparing the 
efficiency levels of entering firms by ownership type.  We use firm-specific estimates of 
productive efficiency calculated from the standardized residuals of the translog production   18
function estimated for each year separately (1992-2000).
27  Based on its individual efficiency 
measure, each firm is categorized each year by whether it falls in the bottom, middle or top third 
of the overall distribution of efficiency.  The values in Table 7 indicate the annual probability 
that a firm will enter the market in the bottom, middle or top of the distribution.
28  As may be 
seen from the table, in both countries, foreign firms are most likely to enter at the top of the 
distribution, with about a 50% probability.  The pattern for mixed firms varies across the two 
countries: in the Czech Republic they are most likely to start at the top and the middle, whereas 
in Russia they are most likely to enter at the top or bottom of the distribution.
29  Private firms are 
equally likely to enter the market in any of these three parts of the distribution in both countries.  
Whereas the same is true for state enterprises in the Czech Republic, in Russia, state enterprises 
are most likely to enter at the bottom of the distribution. 
Our parametric test consists of augmenting the production function in equation (1) by 
interaction terms between ownership dummy variables and a variable “startup” which is coded 
one in the first year of a firm’s existence and zero otherwise.  The coefficient on interaction 
terms gives the relative efficiency of startups to existing firms in the same ownership category.  
We present OLS and random effects estimates of the key coefficients in Table 8.  In both 
countries, the newly created foreign firms are less efficient than existing foreign firms.   
However, by adding the ownership specific startup coefficients to the corresponding base 
ownership coefficients, one finds that with the exception of Czech startups with mixed 
ownership (which often have foreign investors), foreign owned startups are more efficient than 
domestic startups. Moreover, according to both OLS and RE estimates in the Czech Republic 
and the OLS estimates in Russia, domestic startups are more efficient than existing domestic 
firms .  Hence, our results suggest that startups, especially foreign owned ones, have a positive 
effect on productive efficiency of the emerging market economies.  
3.2. Selective Acquisitions by Foreign Firms 
An alternative but complementary hypothesis about the superior performance of foreign-
owned firms is that foreign investors enter emerging market economies by acquiring the more 
                                                 
27 We standardize the residuals because we recognize that there may be year-to-year variation in the distribution of 
the residuals that reflects changes in inflation, or shocks to the economy, which we want to control for. 
28 A random distribution would be represented by equal probabilities (of 33.3%) in each category since the sum of 
the three probabilities must necessarily equals one. 
29 The Czech firms with mixed ownership have the same probability of starting in the top third of the efficiency 
distribution as do the foreign owned firms.    19
productive domestic firms (“creaming”).  This hypothesis implies that foreign firms move 
instantly ahead of the average domestic firms and that the latter experience declining average 
efficiency as a result of their deteriorating composition (negative duration dependence).  In this 
scenario, the foreign investors gain efficiency advantage by selective acquisition of firms rather 
than by special capabilities that they bring in or by superior learning and other gradual 
improvements in performance.  A competing hypothesis, also consistent with the evidence 
provided earlier, is that foreign investors select less efficient firms and turn them around. 
  In order to test these hypotheses, we estimate a probit model to see whether the more or 
less efficient domestic firms have a greater probability of being acquired by foreign investors.  
Specifically, we test whether the productive efficiency of a domestic firm in year t-1 affects the 
probability of being acquired by a foreign firm at t.
30  We control for the firm’s ownership at t-1 
and the type of ownership interacted with the calendar time, the logarithm of the firm’s capital 
(to control for size), and industry, year and regional dummy variables.
31 
The marginal effects from the probit, reported in Table 9, indicate that in both countries 
foreign investors tend to acquire the more efficient domestic firms.  The effect is larger in the 
Czech Republic than in Russia but, while highly statistically significant, its economic 
significance is limited in both countries.  One standard deviation increase in domestic firm’s 
productive efficiency leads to an increase in the mean annual probability of the firm being 
acquired by a foreign firm from 2.12% to 2.87% in the Czech Republic and from 0.41% to 
0.45% in Russia.
32  The results of our estimation hence suggest that foreign investors indeed 
“cream” but that the part of their superior performance that can be explained by selective 
acquisitions of local firms is limited.  Our estimates reject the competing hypothesis that foreign 
investors select less efficient firms and turn them around. 
                                                 
30 The measure of productive efficiency continues to be the annual RE firm-specific residual estimated from the 
translog production functions for each year, which we normalize to have zero mean and unitary standard deviation.  
31 Coefficients on more distant lags of the efficiency variable were statistically insignificant.  Foreign investors 
hence seem to be guided by current performance. 
32 Given that SOEs are the base and the linear time trend hence captures the interaction of state ownership and time, 
we see that in the Czech Republic foreign investors are more likely to acquire domestic private firms than SOEs or 
firms with mixed ownership, and that the probability of acquisitions rises for all types of firms over time.  In Russia, 
firms with mixed ownership have a lower base probability of being acquired by a foreign firm, but the mean 
probability of being acquired by a foreign investor rises for them and for the private firms over time by 19.7% and 
14.3%, respectively.  Finally, in both economies, the probability of a firm being acquired rises with the size of its 
capital stock, indicating that foreign investors tend to acquire larger rather than smaller firms.   20
3.3. Differential Rates of Learning and Innovation by Existing Firms 
The next set of hypotheses that we examine is that domestic and foreign firms learn how 
to operate in the local emerging market economy at different speeds.  In particular, foreign firms 
start their operations in the emerging markets with limited local knowledge and their efficiency 
may be expected to rise over time as they acquire this knowledge.  Domestic firms in turn enter 
the transition with a lack of knowledge of the operation of a market economy, as well as a lack of 
western managerial and technical know-how.  Their efficiency increases as they acquire this 
knowledge.  The evolution of the relative position of foreign and domestic firms in the overall 
distribution of efficiency, depicted in Figure 4, reflects the uneven speed of these two processes. 
We start by estimating the growth of efficiency of firms over the period τ during which 
they are owned by a particular type of owner (i.e., foreign, domestic private, state or mixed).  We 
obtain these estimates by adding to equation (1) a term capturing the interaction of τ (the length 
of time since the start of a given ownership) and Zit (the vector of ownership dummies).  The 
estimates of these time varying coefficients, presented in Table 10, indicate that the foreign-state 
efficiency gap has been steadily increasing over time in both countries.  In the Czech Republic, 
for instance, the efficiency of SOEs has declined by 0-2.5% per year, while the efficiency of 
foreign firms increased at a rate of 0-3.4% every year since the foreigners became owners, 
resulting in significant differentials in most estimates.  In Russia, although the efficiency of 
SOEs has grown at 0-3.8% per year of ownership, the efficiency of foreign firms increased 
considerably faster at 6.2-16.4% per year. The growth in efficiency of domestic private and 
mixed firms relative to the efficiency of SOEs falls over time in all estimations in Russia.  
We next test the Aghion et al. (2002 and 2003) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti’s 
(2002 and 2003) hypothesis that competition brought about by the transition and entry of new 
firms encourages learning and innovative behavior of firms that are near the technological 
frontier but stifles learning among those firms that lag significantly behind.  According to this 
view, we should observe convergence toward the frontier by the more efficient firms, but 
divergence or outright failure on the part of the less efficient firms.  In order to provide evidence 
on this hypothesis, we test whether more efficient firms have a higher (lower) probability than 
less efficient firms of moving up (down) in the overall distribution of productive efficiency in 
any given year.  We also check if the less efficient firms are more likely to exit than the more 
efficient ones.  To carry out these tests, in every year we allocate firms into the bottom third,   21
middle third and top third of the overall efficiency distribution on the basis of their individual 
estimated productive efficiency.
33  For firms within each ownership category we calculate the 
average annual probability that a firm in a given efficiency group moves to one of the other two 
efficiency groups, stays in the same group, or exits during the 1992-2000 period.  These 
probabilities are reported in 3x4 annual transition matrices for each ownership category in Table 
11, with the groups of origin being given by the row names and the groups of destination by the 
names of the columns.  The bootstrap standard errors corresponding to the transition probabilities 
are very small, indicating each probability is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
The proximity to the frontier hypothesis is supported by the behavior of foreign firms in 
Russia and (somewhat less so) in the Czech Republic.  It is contradicted, however, by the 
behavior of domestic private, mixed and state-owned firms.  As may be seen from Table 11, the 
probability that foreign firms in the middle efficiency group move into the top group is higher 
than the probability that foreign firms in the bottom efficiency group move to the middle group 
(32.7% vs. 18.0% in Russia and 19.9% vs. 14.6% in the Czech Republic).  Similarly, the 
probability that foreign firms in the top efficiency group move down into the middle group is 
smaller than the probability that they move from the middle to the bottom group (8.8% vs. 14.6% 
in Russia and 13.7% vs. 14.7% in the Czech Republic).  In contrast, the counterpart probabilities 
are virtually indistinguishable within each of the three categories of domestically owned firms in 
Russia, and they are actually reversed in the Czech Republic.  Hence, in the Czech Republic the 
probability of moving from the bottom to the middle group is higher than the probability of 
moving from the middle to the top group within each of the three domestic ownership categories 
(19.2% vs. 14.7% for the SOEs, 15.1% vs. 13.0% for the private firms and 17.9% vs. 11.5% for 
firms with mixed ownership).  Similarly, the probability of moving down from the middle to the 
bottom group is smaller than moving from the top to the middle group within two of the three 
domestic ownership categories, with private firms being the exception.  
The proximity to the frontier hypothesis also does not receive much support in the 
probabilities of exit if one ignores the exit rates of the group of the least efficient firms that are 
likely to have high exit rates in general and on account of various theories.  Focusing on firms in 
the middle and top efficiency groups, it may be seen from Table 11 that in all ownership 
categories in both countries the probability of exit is very similar for firms from the top and 
                                                 
33 The measure of efficiency is again each firm’s residual from an annual translog production function that is   22
middle efficiency groups.  In other words, the idea that firms that are further from the frontier 
would be more likely to fail than the ones near the frontier is not supported by data for the top 
and middle-level efficiency firms.  However, one could argue that the distance to the frontier 
hypothesis receives some support from the fact that the exit rates are higher in Russia than in the 
Czech Republic, where the level of development is higher and institutions are stronger.
34  
The transition probabilities in Table 11 also complement our findings in Table 10 that 
foreign firms are learning more rapidly than domestic firms.  We find that in both countries 
foreign firms are more likely to move up in the overall efficiency distribution (especially into the 
top group) and stay in the top group than firms in any of the three domestic ownership 
categories, which in turn display similar patterns of mobility.  Firms with foreign ownership are 
also less likely to move down in the overall distribution than the other types of firms.  The 
differential pattern of mobility between the foreign and domestic firms is more pronounced in 
Russia than in the Czech Republic.  For example, in Russia foreign firms in the middle efficiency 
group have a 33% probability of moving into the top group and a 15% probability of moving into 
the bottom group within a year.  The corresponding probabilities in the state, mixed and private 
firms are 17-19% for moving to the top and 18-20% for moving to the bottom.  In the Czech 
Republic foreign firms in the middle group have a 20% probability of moving into the top group 
and a 15% probability of moving into the bottom group.  Czech state, mixed and private firms 
face a 12-15% probability of moving from the middle to the top group and a 19-23% probability 
of moving into the bottom group. Our estimates hence indicate that domestic firms are improving 
their efficiency slower than the foreign owned firms, a finding that is consistent with the 
hypothesis that domestic firms are learning slower than foreign firms. 
Using the 3x3 sub-matrices reflecting the bottom, middle and top efficiency states in 
Table 11, we have also calculated the stationary probability matrices of efficiency by ownership. 
With bootstrap standard errors being small, we find that in both economies the stationary 
probability that foreign owned firms are in the top third of the overall efficiency distribution is 
twice as high as the corresponding probability for any of the three types of domestic firms.  In 
particular, in the Czech Republic the stationary probability of the foreign firms being in the top 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimated without ownership variables.   
34 However, the relative magnitude of exit rates across ownership varies in the two countries.  In Russia, the 
probability that a foreign, mixed or private firm exits is generally higher than the probability that a state enterprise 
exits.  In the Czech Republic, the reverse is true: the SOEs have higher exit rates than the others.   23
group is 0.45, while the corresponding probabilities of the domestic private, mixed and state 
firms are 0.21, 0.22 and 0.26.  In Russia, the corresponding probability values are 0.69, 0.30, 
0.29, and 0.30.
35 
3.4. Conditional (β) Convergence 
  Our previous analysis does not reveal any signs of convergence of domestic firms to the 
world efficiency frontier defined by the best foreign-owned firms.  The question arises as to 
whether this is because domestic firms converge more slowly or because they converge to a 
lower (steady state) level of efficiency than the foreign firms.  We examine this question by 
estimating a dynamic conditional convergence equation of the form 
ip ip ip ip ip ip u P I Z Z + + + + = − ν δ η ϕ κ ϕ 1 , (6) 
where ϕip is the logarithm of the average efficiency of each firm i in each consecutive two-year 
period p, Zip is a vector of categories of ownership (averaged across the two years within each  
period p), κ proxies the steady state efficiency levels of firms with different types of ownership, 
η is (the negative of the log of) the speed of convergence of firms to their ownership-specific 
steady state efficiency level, Iip is a set of industry dummy variables controlling for industry-
specific (e.g., technology) factors that may affect the steady state efficiency levels of firms, and 
P are period dummies (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
36  Equation (6) hence allows both 
the steady state efficiency levels and the speed of convergence to vary with ownership type.  In 
order to reduce the effects of short-term variations in the data, we use for each firm its estimated 
two-year average efficiency levels during the 1993-2000 period.  We estimate equation (6) by 
pooled OLS as well as by using the difference between the third and second lags as an 
instrumental variable for the first lag of efficiency in our level equation (see Arellano and Bover, 
1995).   
The OLS and IV estimates of the conditional convergence model are reported in Table 
12, with the SOEs again serving as the base.  As may be seen from the estimates of κ in the 
second and third rows, all three types of domestic firms are converging to the same steady state 
                                                 
35 The stationary probability matrices also indicate that foreign owned firms are much less likely to be in the bottom 
tier of the efficiency distribution. The respective stationary probabilities for the foreign, mixed, private and state 
firms are 0.26, 0.40, 0.45, and 0.38 for the Czech Republic and 0.13, 0.36, 0.36, and 0.37 in Russia. 
36 Although the two literatures do not cross-reference each other, equation (6) can be shown to be in the same class 
of functions as that estimated by Griffith, Redding and Simpson (2002) on British firms.   24
level (except possibly for the mixed firms in the Czech Republic). On the other hand, foreign 
firms are converging to a 0.11 to 0.23 log point higher steady state level in the Czech Republic 
and a 0.34-0.40 log point higher level of efficiency in Russia. The estimated  η coefficient on 
lagged efficiency in row four measures the speed of convergence of the SOEs (the base 
category), while the coefficients in rows five to seven give the difference in the speed of 
convergence of the other ownerships categories relative to SOEs (where the speed of 
convergence is given by 1 - η). These estimates suggest that in the Czech Republic all four types 
of firms are converging to their respective steady states at the same speed.  In Russia, foreign 
firms converge at a faster speed than the three types of domestic firms, which are converging at 
the same speed.  The results suggest that the nature of the convergence is such that foreign firms 
will remain more efficient in both the short and long run.  
3.5. Development, Institutions and Market Culture 
Overall, our results suggest that for a number of reasons foreign owned firms start with 
higher productive efficiency, are better able to increase this efficiency over time and converge 
toward a higher steady state efficiency level than domestic firms.  The results imply that 
domestic firms are not “catching up” with the world standard as they are privatized and face 
more competition, and that they may not catch up even in the long term. 
These results are complemented by Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell’s (2005) study, 
which shows that foreign firms have negative efficiency spillovers on local firms in the same 
industry and that while the negative spillovers diminish over time in the Czech Republic, they 
become increasingly more negative in Russia.  These findings are in stark contrast to those of 
Griffith, Redding and Simpson (2002) for the UK, who find that establishments further behind 
the technological frontier experience faster rates of productivity growth and that increased 
foreign presence within an industry raises the speed of convergence to the technological frontier.  
These and related findings suggest that the effect of multinational corporations on local firms 
varies with the level of economic, legal and institutional development: FDI tends to crowd out 
local firms in relatively undeveloped countries with weak legal and institutional systems, but it 
yields positive technological spillovers for local firms in more developed economies and 
institutional systems.  
The Russian data permit us to pursue the above hypothesis more sharply.  In particular, 
we can go some way toward distinguishing whether the different findings for Russia and the   25
Czech Republic are brought about by differences in (a) the level of economic development, (b) 
the institutional/ legal structure and (c) the market/business culture stemming from the physical 
proximity to a western market economy.  In order to do so, we focus on the Moscow and St. 
Petersburg regions of Russia, both of which happen to have a similar population size as the 
Czech Republic.  The Moscow region resembles the Czech Republic in that it is economically 
much more advanced than the other Russian regions.  The St. Petersburg region resembles the 
Czech Republic in that it borders on a western market economy and, like the Czech Republic, is 
often said to have more of a western market/business culture.  The Moscow and St. Petersburg 
regions could hence be expected to generate similar results to those for the Czech Republic on 
account of the level of development and market/business culture, respectively.  Yet, the two 
regions share with the rest of Russia the legal and institutional environment.  In order to assess 
which effect dominates, we carry out the estimations reported in Tables 1 and 10 on data from 
firms located in the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions and check whether the estimated 
coefficients resemble more those from the Czech Republic or Russia as a whole.  We find that 
the parameter estimates for both Moscow and St. Petersburg are similar to those for Russia as a 
whole rather than the Czech Republic.  This result suggests that policies and institutional 
environment rather than the level of economic development or market/business culture determine 
the relative performance of foreign and domestic firms. 
4. Conclusions 
The Czech Republic and Russia represent important alternative models of transition and 
implementation of the development policies known widely as the Washington Consensus 
policies – the Central-East European (CEE) model and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) model, respectively. The two models differ markedly in the degree to which they have 
opened their markets to competition from trade and foreign direct investment and the extent to 
which they developed market-oriented institutions and legal system. Hence, they provide suitable 
alternative laboratories for testing the effects of the Washington Consensus policies on the 
efficiency of firms. We use large firm-level data sets from these two countries to examine 
whether the systemic changes and market liberalization during 1992-2000 enabled local firms to 
converge in productive efficiency to the world standard which we define as the efficiency of 
foreign owned firms in these economies.  In doing so, we provide micro-econometric   26
foundations for the debate about the effects of globalization, privatization and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on economic development.  
Guided by the ideas of the Washington consensus, both the CEE and CIS countries 
carried out large scale privatizations on the presumption that this would increase the efficiency of 
firms.  Although the Russian privatization is characterized more by selling to insiders than the 
Czech privatization, our results indicate that the method did not matter in that firms with 
domestic private and mixed ownership are similarly efficient and their efficiency is only slightly 
higher than that of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the Czech Republic and either slightly 
higher or lower, depending on the estimation method, in Russia.  These results suggest that a 
principal justification for carrying out large scale privatizations of state assets to domestic private 
owners has not been borne out by performance during the post-privatization decade. Referring to 
policies related primarily to household income distribution, Francois Bourguignon asked in a 
keynote address whether development policies do not often bring about “wrong transfers of 
wealth.”
37  Since both the CEE and CIS economies have transferred 50-90% of their total capital 
stock from state to private hands, the lack of a substantial positive effect on productive efficiency 
raises a major question about the effectiveness of this particular form of a very large policy-
driven wealth transfer. 
The Washington Consensus also advocated foreign direct investment (FDI) as a vehicle 
for development -- both through the higher efficiency of the multinationals and the positive 
effects foreign firms would have on domestic firms’ efficiency.  We find that foreign owned 
firms are far more efficient than domestic firms in both countries.  However, the efficiency gap 
between domestic and foreign firms is not closing and foreign-owned firms increasingly displace 
local firms in the top three deciles of the efficiency distribution.  We demonstrate that one factor 
contributing to this displacement is that foreign-owned startups tend to be more efficient than 
domestic startups, which in turn are more efficient than existing domestic firms.  We also show 
that foreign investors tend to acquire more efficient domestic firms, although the magnitude of 
this effect is limited.  Finally, a factor explaining the gap and displacement is that existing 
foreign owned firms are improving their efficiency (learning) faster than domestic firms. 
A recent literature is hypothesizing that the development policies pursued under the 
Washington Consensus are more effective in increasing growth/efficiency in countries/firms that 
                                                 
37 August 2004 European Meetings of the Econometric Society.   27
are closer to the frontier, but that the policies are too overwhelming and may even cause failure 
in the less efficient countries/firms.  Our study provides evidence related to this hypothesis both 
at the country and the firm levels.  At the country level, we find that the foreign-domestic 
efficiency gap is much larger in Russia than the Czech Republic and that domestic firms 
continue to fall behind in Russia over the entire 1992-2000 period, whereas in the Czech 
Republic the gap stabilizes in the second half of the period.  This evidence may be interpreted as 
supporting the hypothesis since the Czech Republic is closer than Russia to the “frontier” in 
terms of its initial efficiency. However, we cannot rule out the alternative hypothesis that the 
differential in the gap is due to greater liberalization and competition or more market-oriented 
institutional development in the Czech Republic.  
At the firm level we test the “proximity to the frontier” hypothesis by examining whether 
firms at the middle or highest levels of productive efficiency are more likely to improve their 
efficiency and less likely to exit than firms that at the lower efficiency levels.  We find the 
hypothesis is supported by the behavior of foreign owned firms but contradicted by the behavior 
of all three types of domestic firms.  We also find divergence in the efficiency of the 
domestically owned firms relative to the efficiency frontier set by foreign firms.  Moreover, we 
show that in both countries foreign firms are converging to a higher steady state level of 
efficiency than domestic firms. Finally, by comparing the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions to 
the Czech Republic, we provide evidence suggesting that institutional and legal environment, 
rather than level of economic development or market/business culture, accounts for the different 
patterns observed for the Czech Republic and Russia. 
Overall, rather than finding evidence supporting either the basic or the nuanced version of 
the Washington consensus policies, we show that both the CEE and CIS countries continue to 
face the development challenge of how to bring their firms to the world efficiency standard.  The 
CEE economies are meeting this challenge by rapidly increasing the shares of their GDP and 
exports accounted for by foreign firms -- an option that is not readily open to all developing 
countries and that raises the question of whether foreign capital is too foot-lose to constitute a 
reliable basis for long term economic development.
38  In contrast, the CIS economies have not 
                                                 
38 Studies by Fabbri, Haskel and Slaughter (2002), Bernard and Jensen (2002) and Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) 
suggest that controlling for firm size and productivity multinational firms are more likely to close their plants than 
domestic firms.  An evaluation of the welfare effects of foreign ownership hence needs to examine other factors in 
addition to whether domestic firms that are being displaced by foreign firms are the poorly or well performing ones.   28
yet started to meet the challenge, despite the fact that it will become increasingly acute as 
globalization proceeds and the countries become more open economies, with or without entering 
WTO.  Finally, our results indicate that future research needs to examine carefully the 
differential effect that development policies, FDI and globalization in general have on (a) the 
performance of local vs. foreign owned firms and (b) the macro performance of the emerging 
market economies.   29
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Table 1: Percentage Share of Industrial Firms, Employment and Output by Ownership 
Type, for Selected Years   
 
  Czech Republic  Russia 
   1992  1996       2000  1993  1996  2000 
Firm Shares           
Foreign 3.5  12.6  30.7  1.8  3.5  5.6 
Mixed    0.7 21.0  12.9 32.6 42.7  28.2 
Private (domestic)    18.4  57.4  54.1  16.7  38.3  51.3 
State 77.4  9.0  2.4  48.9  15.6  15.0 
Employment Shares          
Foreign  2.6 12.1  33.7  0.7 1.9  11.5 
Mixed   0.1 42.6  25.9 38.0 56.2  35.2 
Private (domestic)    10.2 36.7  37.6  9.0 28.0  44.5 
State  87.0 8.6  2.9  52.3 13.8  8.8 
Output Shares          
Foreign  7.7 21.4  51.1  2.3 3.0  19.6 
Mixed   0.1 40.8  22.3 45.5 68.6  33.3 
Private (domestic)    7.6 30.6  24.9  6.8 19.5  41.7 
State  84.6 7.2  1.7  45.4 8.9  5.4 
No. of obs.  1537  2283       2084  17923  17138  15035 
 
Notes:  In the Czech Republic the ownership category is based on majority ownership while in Russia, it is based on 
100% ownership, except for foreign ownership, which can be partial.  The sample consists of firms with non-
missing values for industry, ownership, output, fixed assets, and employment.   33
Table 2: Average Effects of Ownership on Productive Efficiency, 1992-2000 
 
Czech Republic 
 
  OLS QREG  RE  FE 2SLS-RE BB 
Foreign  0.435** 0.413** 0.319** 0.275** 0.349** 0.657** 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.037) 
Mixed  0.122** 0.086** 0.110** 0.094** 0.097** 0.074* 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.031) 
Private  0.145** 0.122** 0.115** 0.117** 0.075** 0.053* 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.027) 
No.  of  obs.  19,971 19,971 19,971 19,971 15,142 19,971 
No.  of  firms  4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 3,781 4,657 
R
2  0.754 0.526 0.741 0.656 0.754  … 
 
Russia 
 
  OLS QREG  RE  FE 2SLS-RE  BB 
Foreign  0.994** 0.885** 0.398** 0.176** 0.629** 0.771** 
  (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.049) 
Mixed  0.124**  0.159** -0.020** -0.050** -0.110**  0.081** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.016) 
Private  0.163**  0.174** -0.019*  -0.060** -0.114**  0.140** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.017) 
No.  of  obs.  153,402 153,402 153,402 153,402 140,658 153,402 
No.  of  firms  26,286 26,286 26,286 26,286 24,595 26,286 
R
2  0.680 0.482 0.670 0.594 0.688  … 
 
Notes:  Coefficients = estimated log effects of different types of ownership relative to state ownership. Standard 
errors are in parentheses (robust in OLS); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The estimates are obtained 
from the translog production function specified in equation (1) and which includes industry dummies, year 
dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  τ is the time since the change in the corresponding ownership status.  
QREG – median regression, RE – random effects estimator, FE – fixed effects estimator, 2SLS-RE – two stage 
least squares random effect estimator, and BB – Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (first four lags of levels 
and differences in inputs and ownership are used as instruments for differences and levels, respectively).  Both 
2SLS-RE and BB estimators use exogenous information on ministries under central planning as instruments for 
endogenous variables.   34
Table 3:  Average Effects of Ownership on Productive Efficiency by Period  
 
 Czech  Republic  Russia 
  OLS QREG  RE  FE 2SLS-RE  OLS QREG  RE  FE 2SLS-RE 
  1992-1994 
Foreign  0.263** 0.285** 0.246** 0.218*  0.331** 0.580** 0.455** 0.373**  -0.235** 0.772** 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.092) (0.054) (0.054) (0.036) (0.043) (0.077) (0.077) 
Mixed  0.178**  0.156* 0.137* 0.078    0.283* 0.126**  0.136**  -0.016*  -0.039**  0.046 
  (0.058) (0.066) (0.057) (0.077) (0.113) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.093) 
Private  0.042   0.042   0.057*  0.099   0.054  0.120**  0.109**  0.005  -0.015  0.011 
  (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.058) (0.031) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.058) 
No. of obs.  6,657   6,657   6,657   6,657   3,331  53,371 53,371 53,371 53,371 47,010 
R
2  0.762    0.551 0.760 0.595    0.800 0.670 0.503 0.666 0.523 0.689 
  1995-1997 
Foreign   0.462**    0.432**    0.195**    0.078**   0.266**  0.957**  0.850**  0.626**  0.020  0.985** 
      (0.032)      (0.033)      (0.025)      (0.029)  (0.042)  (0.036)  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.054)  (0.049) 
Mixed   0.061*        0.063        0.015       -0.001  0.065*  0.150**  0.161**  0.116**  0.025  0.153** 
      (0.029)      (0.033)      (0.016)      (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.031) 
Private   0.147**    0.146**        0.027        0.001   -0.008  0.186**  0.186**  0.116**  0.004  0.165** 
      (0.024)      (0.026)      (0.016)      (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.031) 
No.  of  obs.  6,786 6,786 6,786 6,786 6,054  53,035 53,035 53,035 53,035 49872 
R
2  0.7517  0.522 0.741 0.647    0.755 0.692 0.479 0.685 0.518 0.696 
  1998-2000 
Foreign  0.555** 0.449** 0.218**  -0.035  0.301** 1.086** 0.980** 0.666** 0.101  1.223** 
  (0.059) (0.046) (0.045) (0.059) (0.070) (0.031) (0.026) (0.033) (0.058) (0.054) 
Mixed  0.250** 0.115*  0.019    -0.105* -0.008  0.123** 0.162** 0.135** 0.025  0.076* 
  (0.060) (0.048) (0.043) (0.050) (0.072) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.046) (0.032) 
Private  0.275** 0.163** 0.040    -0.108  0.031  0.204** 0.208** 0.203** 0.052  0.173** 
  (0.058) (0.045) (0.045) (0.061) (0.068) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.047) (0.029) 
No.  of  obs.  6,528 6,528 6,528 6,528 5,757  46,996 46,996 46,996 46,996 43,776 
R
2  0.750    0.510 0.737 0.609 0.752 0.696 0.487 0.686 0.615 0.705 
 
Notes:  Coefficients = estimated log effects of different types of ownership relative to state ownership.  Standard errors are in parentheses (robust in OLS);  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The estimates are obtained from the translog production function specified in equation (1) and which includes industry 
dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  The estimation methods are the same as in Table 2.  Blundell-Bond system GMM estimation is not performed 
because of the short length of the sub-periods.    35
Table 4: Quantile Estimates of Ownership Effects by Percentile and Period, the Czech Republic 
 
Percentile  Foreign-State  Mixed-State Private-State  Foreign-Mixed  Foreign-Private
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)=(1)-(2) (5)=(1)-(3) 
1992-1994 
0.187**  0.162 0.019 0.025 0.168**  10 
(0.057) (0.090) (0.035) (0.101) (0.056) 
0.198**  0.128 0.005 0.070 0.193**  25 
(0.044) (0.070) (0.027) (0.078) (0.043) 
0.285**  0.156*  0.042 0.129 0.243**  50 
(0.042) (0.066) (0.025) (0.074) (0.040) 
0.368** 0.082  0.063*  0.286** 0.305**  75 
(0.046) (0.072) (0.026) (0.081) (0.044) 
0.389**  0.155 0.072 0.235*  0.318**  90 
(0.067) (0.104) (0.038) (0.116) (0.064) 
1995-1997 
0.347** 0.121** 0.141** 0.225** 0.206**  10 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.031) (0.038) (0.033) 
0.387** 0.049  0.109** 0.338** 0.278**  25 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.029) (0.037) (0.031) 
0.432** 0.063  0.146** 0.369** 0.286**  50 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.034) (0.027) 
0.527** 0.015  0.141** 0.513** 0.386**  75 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.032) (0.043) (0.034) 
0.470** 0.041  0.101** 0.429** 0.370**  90 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.039) (0.053) (0.042) 
1998-2000 
0.615** 0.551** 0.439** 0.065  0.177**  10 
(0.065) (0.069) (0.062) (0.040) (0.031) 
0.476** 0.300** 0.239** 0.176** 0.237**  25 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.052) (0.032) (0.024) 
0.449** 0.115*  0.163** 0.334** 0.287**  50 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.028) (0.020) 
0.457** 0.070  0.152** 0.387** 0.305**  75 
(0.055) (0.058) (0.053) (0.033) (0.024) 
0.448**  0.000 0.127 0.447**  0.320**  90 
(0.075) (0.079) (0.072) (0.044) (0.034) 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The percentile estimates are 
obtained from the quantile regression of output on capital and labor inputs (translog specification), industry 
dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  The omitted (base) ownership category is state 
ownership.   36
Table 5: Quantile Estimates of Ownership Effects by Percentile and Period, Russia 
 
Percentile  Foreign-State  Mixed-State Private-State  Foreign-Mixed  Foreign-Private
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)=(1)-(2) (5)=(1)-(3) 
1992-1994 
0.134* 0.213**  0.193**  -0.078 -0.059  10 
(0.054) (0.016) (0.019) (0.054) (0.055) 
0.309** 0.152** 0.113** 0.158** 0.196**  25 
(0.040) (0.012) (0.014) (0.040) (0.040) 
0.455** 0.136** 0.109** 0.319** 0.346**  50 
(0.036) (0.011) (0.013) (0.036) (0.037) 
0.635** 0.105** 0.099** 0.530** 0.535**  75 
(0.036) (0.012) (0.014) (0.036) (0.037) 
1.040** 0.059** 0.064** 0.981** 0.976**  90 
(0.052) (0.017) (0.019) (0.052) (0.053) 
1995-1997 
0.517** 0.169** 0.230** 0.348** 0.287**  10 
(0.047) (0.024) (0.024) (0.044) (0.045) 
0.690** 0.197** 0.221** 0.492** 0.469**  25 
(0.032) (0.016) (0.016) (0.031) (0.031) 
0.850** 0.161** 0.186** 0.689** 0.664**  50 
(0.025) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) 
1.116** 0.129** 0.132** 0.986** 0.983**  75 
(0.026) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025) 
1.388** 0.138** 0.130** 1.250** 1.258**  90 
(0.032) (0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.031) 
1998-2000 
0.617** 0.075*  0.163** 0.543** 0.454**  10 
(0.050) (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.045) 
0.779** 0.140** 0.179** 0.639** 0.599**  25 
(0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.027) 
0.980** 0.162** 0.208** 0.817** 0.772**  50 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) 
1.172** 0.151** 0.191** 1.021** 0.981**  75 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) 
1.356** 0.188** 0.248** 1.168** 1.108**  90 
(0.034) (0.021) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The percentile estimates are 
obtained from the quantile regression of output on capital and labor inputs (translog specification), industry 
dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  The omitted (base) ownership category is state 
ownership.   37
 
 
Table 6:  Distance to the Efficiency Frontier by Percentile, Ownership, and Period 
 
Czech Republic 
 
 Foreign  State  Private  Mixed 
Percentile  1992-
1994 
1995-
1997 
1998-
2000 
1992-
1994 
1995-
1997 
1998-
2000 
1992-
1994 
1995-
1997 
1998-
2000 
1992-
1994 
1995-
1997 
1998-
2000 
10  0.291 0.219 0.207 0.246 0.180 0.140 0.254 0.186 0.190 0.267 0.193 0.199 
25  0.415 0.350 0.346 0.325 0.241 0.225 0.330 0.250 0.260 0.387 0.266 0.279 
50  0.608 0.572 0.554 0.448 0.338 0.330 0.439 0.347 0.380 0.531 0.353 0.357 
75  0.886 0.853 0.835 0.590 0.476 0.499 0.619 0.504 0.544 0.707 0.481 0.496 
90  1.120 1.120 1.106 0.778 0.690 0.671 0.856 0.743 0.778 1.001 0.641 0.730 
 
Russia 
 
 Foreign  State  Private  Mixed 
Percentile  1992-
1994 
1995-
1997 
1998-
2000 
1992-
1994 
1995-
1997 
1998-
2000 
1992-
1994 
1995-
1997 
1998-
2000 
1992-
1994 
1995-
1997 
1998-
2000 
10  0.078 0.075 0.094 0.066 0.035 0.036 0.078 0.053 0.047 0.086 0.051 0.041 
25  0.159 0.157 0.166 0.114 0.061 0.070 0.125 0.089 0.088 0.135 0.090 0.083 
50  0.280 0.321 0.338 0.186 0.118 0.129 0.200 0.148 0.152 0.208 0.149 0.146 
75  0.723 0.679 0.706 0.305 0.206 0.215 0.331 0.232 0.247 0.333 0.235 0.240 
90  1.309 1.319 1.280 0.471 0.328 0.325 0.497 0.355 0.387 0.505 0.359 0.370 
 
Notes:  The frontier is defined as the mean productive efficiency of the top third foreign firms in a 2-digit ISIC industry.  
The efficiency estimates are obtained from the translog production function estimated with the random effect estimator for 
each period separately.  The specification includes inputs, ownership dummies, industry dummies, year dummies, and 
controls for data anomalies.  Percentiles are constructed from the distribution of the firm-specific distance to the frontier for 
each ownership type.  For example, looking at Russia during the 1992-1994 period private firms at the 50
th percentile are 
reaching only 20% of the efficiency level of the frontier foreign firms in a corresponding industry.   38
Table 7: The Efficiency Distribution of Startups, by Type of Ownership 1992-2000 
 
Czech Republic    Russia 
  Bottom 
33% 
Middle 
33% 
Top 
33% 
 Bottom 
33% 
Middle 
33% 
Top 
33% 
Foreign  0.255 0.260 0.485    0.317 0.171 0.513 
Mixed  0.140 0.360 0.500    0.324 0.286 0.391 
Private  0.318 0.326 0.356    0.336 0.278 0.386 
State  0.336 0.334 0.330     0.435 0.276 0.289 
 
Notes:  The productive efficiency estimates (PE) are obtained from the standardized residuals of the translog 
production function estimated for each year separately (1992-2000), with industry dummies and controls for data 
anomalies included.  The table shows the average annual probability that a firm will enter the market in the bottom, 
middle or top of the efficiency distribution.  All probabilities are statistically significant at 5% level (using bootstrapped 
standard errors)    39
Table 8:  Relative Efficiency of Startups by Ownership Type, 1992-2000 
 
  Czech Republic    Russia 
 RE  OLS    RE  OLS 
Foreign 0.316**  0.439**  0.411**  1.012** 
 (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.022) 
Mixed 0.097**  0.096**  -0.027**  0.104** 
 (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Private 0.100**  0.133**  -0.024**  0.144** 
 (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
SFor(=Startup*Foreign) -0.057**  -0.010  -0.182**  -0.192** 
 (0.022)  (0.041)  (0.025)  (0.060) 
SMix(=Startup*Mixed) 0.100**  0.426**  -0.039*  0.096** 
 (0.038)  (0.069)  (0.015)  (0.027) 
SPri (=Startup*Private) 0.039**  0.099**  0.016  0.093** 
 (0.012)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.022) 
SSta(=Startup*State) -0.024  0.095**  -0.177**  -0.218** 
 (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.011)  (0.021) 
No. of obs.  19,971  19,971    153,402  153,402 
No. of firms  4,657  4,657    26,286  26,286 
R
2 0.742  0.755  0.670  0.680 
P-values:          
Foreign+ SFor = Private+SPri 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Foreign+ SFor = Mixed+SMix 0.170  0.219  0.000  0.000 
Foreign+ SFor = 0  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Private + SPri  = Mixed+SMix 0.145  0.000  0.005  0.282 
Private + SPri = 0  0.000  0.000  0.611  0.000 
Mixed  + SMix = 0  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses (robust in OLS); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The omitted 
category is state ownership.  The estimates are obtained from the translog production function, given by equation 
(1), which included industry dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  Startup=1 if firm is a startup 
at time t.  RE – random effects estimator.     40
Table 9: The Effect of Local Firm Characteristics on the Probability of Acquisition by 
Foreign Investors, 1993-2000 
 
 Czech  Republic   Russia 
  dF/dX  Mean(X)    dF/dX  Mean(X) 
PEt-1 (Productive Efficiency)  0.750**  0.006  0.047**  0.036 
 (0.087)    (0.010)   
Mixedt-1 1.634  0.114  -0.193**  0.359 
 (1.872)    (0.047)   
Privatet-1 2.030**  0.582  -0.114*  0.314 
 (0.509)    (0.052)   
Mixedt-1* Time  -0.297  0.678  0.080**  1.705 
 (0.177)    (0.013)   
Privatet-1* Time  -0.351**  2.960  0.058**  1.703 
 (0.113)    (0.013)   
Time 0.606**  4.475  -0.004  4.359 
 (0.097)    (0.010)   
lnKt-1 0.548**  11.464  0.085**  0.596 
 (0.060)    (0.006)   
No. of obs.  14,424      122,182   
Pseudo R
2 0.111      0.146   
Unconditional probability (%)  2.121      0.407   
 
Notes:  The reported marginal effects (multiplied by 100) are obtained from probit estimates.  The dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating whether a formerly domestic firm is acquired by foreign investors.  Standard errors 
(multiplied by 100) are in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The omitted category is state 
ownership lagged one year.  The firm-specific measure of productive efficiency (PE) is obtained from the 
standardized residuals of the translog production function estimated for each year separately, with industry dummies 
and controls for data anomalies included.  Time is calendar time, starting with 1 in 1993.  Regional dummies (for 
Russia) and industry dummies are included in the probit estimates but not shown here.    41
 Table 10: Time-Varying Effects of Ownership on Productive Efficiency, 1992-2000 
 
Czech Republic 
  OLS QREG  RE  FE 2SLS-RE BB 
Foreign  0.303** 0.280** 0.149** 0.140** 0.208** 0.337** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.029) (0.046) (0.043) 
Mixed  0.023   0.002   0.009   0.022   0.003  -0.002 
  (0.035) (0.037) (0.023) (0.025) (0.063) (0.046) 
Private  0.144** 0.142** 0.089** 0.103** 0.103** 0.105** 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.029) (0.033) 
τ * Foreign  -0.002  0.006   0.018**  0.033**  0.033** 0.002 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
τ *  Mixed  -0.013 -0.013 -0.003  0.006   0.020* -0.004 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) 
τ *  Private  -0.038** -0.038** -0.031** -0.018** -0.012* -0.038** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
τ *  State  -0.025** -0.017** -0.016** -0.010*  -0.001 -0.017* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
No.  of  obs.  19,971 19,971 19,971 19,971 15,142 19,971 
No.  of  firms  4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 3,781 4,657 
R
2  0.756 0.528 0.744 0.659 0.754  … 
 
Russia 
  OLS QREG  RE  FE 2SLS-RE  BB 
Foreign  0.693** 0.616** 0.296** 0.107** 0.465** 1.155** 
  (0.040) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.132) (0.051) 
Mixed  0.299** 0.373** 0.134** 0.093**  -0.012  0.496** 
  (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.144) (0.026) 
Private  0.332** 0.383** 0.124** 0.071** 0.006  0.548** 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.122) (0.027) 
τ * Foreign  0.131** 0.152** 0.080** 0.068** 0.060** 0.077** 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) 
τ * Mixed  -0.024** -0.016** -0.023** -0.021** -0.014** -0.027** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
τ * Private  -0.023** -0.013** -0.022** -0.020** -0.019** -0.034** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
τ * State  0.014** 0.021** 0.014** 0.013** 0.002  0.037** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) 
No.  of  obs.  153,402 153,402 153,402 153,402 140,658 153,402 
No.  of  firms  26,286 26,286 26,286 26,286 24,595 26,286 
R
2  0.681 0.484 0.672 0.595 0.689  … 
Notes:  Coefficients = estimated log joint effects of different types of ownership relative to state ownership. 
Standard errors are in parentheses (robust in OLS); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The estimates are 
obtained from the translog production function specified in equation (1) and which includes industry dummies, 
year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  τ is the time since the change in the corresponding ownership 
status.  QREG – median regression, RE – random effects estimator, FE – fixed effects estimator, 2SLS-RE – two 
stage least squares random effect estimator, and BB – Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (first four lags of 
levels and differences in inputs and ownership are used as instruments for differences and levels, respectively).  
Both 2SLS-RE and BB estimators use exogenous information on ministries under central planning as instruments 
for endogenous variables.   42
 Table 11: Average Annual Transition Probabilities of Existing Firm Moving Across 
Efficiency Groups by Ownership Type, 1992-2000 
 
Czech Republic    Russia 
Foreign  
 Bottom  Middle  Top  Exit     Bottom  Middle  Top  Exit 
Bottom  0.782 0.146 0.049  0.023    Bottom  0.504 0.180 0.132  0.185 
Middle  0.147 0.648 0.199  0.006    Middle  0.146 0.449 0.327  0.079 
Top  0.018 0.137 0.833  0.012    Top  0.028 0.088 0.823  0.062 
Mixed 
 Bottom  Middle  Top  Exit     Bottom  Middle  Top  Exit 
Bottom  0.782 0.179 0.021  0.018     Bottom  0.694 0.163 0.022  0.121 
Middle  0.191 0.685 0.115  0.010     Middle  0.180 0.596 0.168  0.056 
Top  0.025 0.233 0.735  0.007     Top  0.036 0.187 0.718  0.059 
Private 
  Bottom Middle  Top  Exit     Bottom  Middle  Top  Exit 
Bottom  0.801 0.151 0.018  0.031     Bottom  0.659 0.167 0.023  0.152 
Middle  0.223 0.625 0.130  0.022     Middle  0.182 0.578 0.166  0.074 
Top  0.019 0.199 0.755  0.027     Top  0.037 0.192 0.695  0.076 
State 
 Bottom  Middle  Top  Exit     Bottom  Middle  Top  Exit 
Bottom  0.679 0.192 0.056  0.073    Bottom  0.708 0.177 0.020  0.095 
Middle  0.233 0.572 0.147  0.048    Middle  0.198 0.562 0.188  0.052 
Top  0.042 0.247 0.662  0.050    Top  0.035 0.199 0.711  0.055 
 
Notes:  The average annual probabilities are based on a firm-specific measure of productive efficiency (PE) obtained 
from the standardized residuals of the translog production function estimated for each year separately (1992-2000), 
with industry dummies and controls for data anomalies included.  Based on its individual PE measure, a firm is then 
categorized each year by where it falls in the distribution of PE’s: bottom, middle or top third.  All transition 
probabilities are statistically significant at 5% level (using bootstrapped standard errors), except for a middle-to-exit 
flow of foreign firms and a top-to-exit flow of firms with mixed ownership in the Czech Republic.    43
Table 12:  Parameters of Conditional (β) Convergence by Firm Ownership 
 
 Czech  Republic  Russia 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
Ownership=Foreign  0.106*** 0.226*** 0.340*** 0.397*** 
  (0.020) (0.083) (0.030) (0.118) 
Ownership=Mixed  0.013 0.143*  -0.006  -0.023 
  (0.021) (0.076) (0.008) (0.014) 
Ownership=Private  0.004 0.098 0.003  -0.006 
  (0.016) (0.074) (0.007) (0.014) 
EfficiencyP-1  0.869*** 0.604*  0.862*** 0.983*** 
  (0.033) (0.365) (0.015) (0.060) 
EfficiencyP-1*Foreign   0.017 0.222  -0.084***  -0.287* 
  (0.037) (0.361) (0.028) (0.163) 
EfficiencyP-1*Mixed  -0.091 0.159 0.018  -0.074 
  (0.062) (0.364) (0.019) (0.059) 
EfficiencyP-1*Private  0.028 0.298 0.024  -0.042 
  (0.035) (0.371) (0.018) (0.062) 
No. of obs.  7344 1952  65208  24226 
R
2  0.696 0.748 0.598 0.631 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; **    significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
Dependent variable is firm specific (random effect) efficiency estimated on the 2-year panels.  Industry and period 
dummies are included.  The omitted category is state ownership.  The difference between the third and second lags 
of the efficiency level is used as an instrument.   44
 
Figure 1: Quantile Estimates of Relative Ownership Effects on Efficiency by Period 
 
Czech Republic  Russia 
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Figure 2:  Random Effect Estimates of Relative Ownership Effects on Efficiency by Period 
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Figure 3:  Distance to the Frontier by Ownership and Period 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Productive Efficiency by Ownership and Period 
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Appendix 1:  Data and Variable Description 
The data are drawn from the Annual Registries of Industrial Enterprises, based on the reports of 
medium and large industrial (mining, manufacturing and utilities) firms submitted to the Russian 
Statistical Office and the Czech Statistical Office.  The data come in different formats over the 
years and require cleaning. This includes checking for consistency in variables and measurement 
units, eliminating duplicate observations, finding firms that changed their identification number, 
and standardizing classifications of industry and ownership.  We made every effort to make two 
data sets comparable in terms of their construction and variable definition.   As seen in Appendix 
Table A1, we start with the statistical offices’ data and eliminate firms that are non-industrial, do 
not have 100 or more employees in at least one year or have missing or unreasonable data (e.g., 
negative output).  In any given year, this leaves us with 1,537-2,970 firms in the Czech Republic 
and 15,035-19,209 firms in Russia.  In the Czech Republic, employment in these firms covers 
between 86% and 100% of total employment in enterprises with more than 100 employees.  In 
Russia, our sample represents a significant share of total employment outside of the legally 
defined small enterprises: 89-94% in 1993-95, 81-86% in 1996-97, and 70-73% in 1998-2000.
39  
The definitions of the variables are provided in Table A2, while the means and standard 
deviations of the principal variables are provided in Table A3. 
                                                 
39 In 1993-95, small industrial enterprises in Russia were defined as having 200 or fewer employees.  In 1996-2000, 
they were defined as for-profit enterprises with average annual employment of 100 or fewer workers and with the 
share of state or other legal entity in the charter capital not exceeding 25%.  The drop in sample coverage in 1998-
2000 is mostly due to the exclusion of defense industries and manufacturing of precious metals from the Registry.   52
Table A1:  Construction of the Sample of Firms, 1992-2000 
 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Czech Sample           
Initial number of firms
1  2416 3559 4379 2385 2357 9136  22949 22201  19282
Small firms
2  454 939 1364 19 16 4791  16688 13294  12064
Non-industrial firms
3 0 0 0 2 0 0  2634 4721  3260
Firms with missing 
    observations
4  425 470  45 47 58 2159 1447 1922 1874
Final sample (no. of firms)  1537 2159  2970 2317 2283  2186  2180 2264  2084
  
Russian Sample           
Initial number of firms
1  25824 25633 27983 29053 28607 28601 29139 29153 29252
Small firms
2  7739 6769 7785 8213 8989 9250  10689 10938  11343
Non-industrial firms
3  872 514 754 970 891 895 963 945 940
Firms with missing 
    observations
4  580 427  629 661 1589 1768 1404 1392 1934
Final sample (no. of firms)  16633 17923  18815 19209 17138  16688  16083 15878  15035
 
Notes:  
1 The Czech sample for 1992 and the Russian sample for 1985-2000 constructed from total number of firms at the end 
of the year, whereas the annual number of firms in the Czech 1993-2000 sample is constructed from quarterly 
observations. 
2 Firms with less than 100 employees in all years or which have missing values for number employed in all years. 
3 Firms with a non-industrial or unidentified ISIC classification in all years; 5-digit industry codes (OKONKh) for 
Russian firms were reclassified into new 2-digit ISIC categories. 
4 Missing values and inconsistencies in other key variables: ownership, output and fixed assets. 
5 Czech Statistical Office (2003) and Goskomstat (2001).  Total industrial employment includes employment in small 
enterprises. 
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Table A2:  Description of Variables 
 
Variable Czech  Data  Russian  Data 
Output  1992: Value of production in current 
prices of enterprises;                                   
1993-2000 Revenue from own 
production and services plus change in 
inventory (without  taxes); 
 
Volume of production in current prices 
of enterprises (without taxes) 
Capital 1992:  equity   
1993-2000: tangible and intangible 
assets 
Average value of fixed productive assets 
used in industrial production in a given 
year. 
 
Labor  Average number of fulltime-equivalent 
employees, adjusted on the basis of an 
eight hour day. 
Average number of industrial employees 
in a given year -- partial adjustment is 
made for contracted part-time workers.  
All others are considered as one. 
 
Ownership  Available for 1991-2000. 
Defined as more than 50% ownership:       
1. Private - includes private local firms, 
individuals, cooperatives, and NGOs;  
2. State - includes federal and municipal 
ownership; 
3. Mixed - combination of any types of 
ownership with no one category having 
50%;  
4. Foreign  
Available for 1993-2000. 
Defined as 100% ownership:                      
1. Private - includes private local firms, 
cooperatives, and NGOs; 
2. State - includes federal, regional and 
municipal ownership;  
3. Mixed - combination of any domestic 
types of ownership  
4. Foreign -- including partial ownership 
 
Startup  =1 when a firm appears in the registry 
for the first time 
 
=1 when a firm appears in the registry 
for the first time 
 
Industry - Old 
Classification 
 
3-digit old industry codes are recoded 
into 2-digit ISIC 
5-digit OKONH (Russian Classification 
of Industries of the National Economy) 
Industry - New 
Classification 
2-digit NACE (some years up to 6-digit) 
is recoded into 2-digit ISIC 
 
5-digit OKONH is recoded into 2-digit 
ISIC 
Ministry  Available for 1990-1993. 
4-digit ministry codes are recoded into 8 
ministry categories 
Available for 1985-1995. 
4-digit ministry codes are recoded into 
37 ministry categories 
   54
Table A3:  Mean Log Values of Output, Capital and Labor, 1992-2000 
 
 Czech  Republic  Russian  Federation 
   lnY lnL lnK lnY lnL lnK 
10.067 5.516  11.499 0.449 5.412 0.556  Foreign 
(1.444) (0.886) (2.014) (2.156) (1.357) (2.446) 
10.423 6.111  12.295 0.062 5.779 0.834  Mixed 
(1.356) (1.049) (1.728) (1.847) (1.195) (1.943) 
9.348 5.277  10.650  -0.296 5.480 0.195  Private 
(1.132) (0.761) (1.615) (1.652) (0.989) (1.795) 
9.990 6.003  12.441  -0.088 5.642 0.448  State 
(1.290) (1.018) (1.324) (1.860) (1.197) (1.890) 
9.711 5.567  11.362  -0.089 5.628 0.499  All 
(1.303) (0.942) (1.811) (1.809) (1.145) (1.916) 
N of obs.  19,971   153,402   
 
Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The sample consists of firms with non-missing values on industry, 
ownership, output, fixed assets, and employment.   55
Table A4:  Estimates of the Translog Production Function, 1992-2000 
 
  Czech Republic    Russia 
 RE  OLS    RE  OLS 
lnL 1.322**  1.019**  1.124**  1.452** 
 (0.050)  (0.056)  (0.019)  (0.061) 
lnK -0.099**  -0.274**  0.332**  0.327** 
 (0.023)  (0.046)  (0.010)  (0.030) 
lnL*lnK -0.021**  -0.013  -0.042**  -0.034** 
 (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
lnL
2 -0.013*  -0.008  0.006**  -0.029** 
 (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
lnK
2 0.016**  0.026**  0.017**  0.023** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ownership        
Foreign 0.319**  0.435**  0.398**  0.994** 
 (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021) 
Mixed 0.110**  0.122**  -0.020**  0.124** 
 (0.014)  (0.019)    (0.007)  (0.008) 
Private 0.115**  0.145**    -0.019*  0.163** 
 (0.013)  (0.015)    (0.008)  (0.008) 
Industries          
Fuels -0.729**  -0.915**  -0.829**  -0.826** 
 (0.099)  (0.074)  (0.035)  (0.022) 
Mining -0.912**  -1.091**  -0.545**  -0.720** 
 (0.072)  (0.052)  (0.039)  (0.021) 
Light -1.111**  -1.147**  -0.554**  -0.581** 
 (0.034)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.010) 
Wood -1.103**  -1.040**  -0.769**  -0.853** 
 (0.045)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.008) 
Paper -0.654**  -0.639**  -0.414**  -0.502** 
 (0.044)  (0.024)  (0.041)  (0.016) 
Chemicals -0.861**  -0.808**  -0.461**  -0.470** 
 (0.037)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.015) 
Building Materials  -1.054**  -1.088**  -0.616**  -0.671** 
 (0.041)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.008) 
Metals -0.867**  -0.809**  -0.688**  -0.679** 
 (0.030)  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.012) 
Machinery n.e.c.  -1.091**  -1.088**  -0.834**  -0.941** 
 (0.030)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.009) 
Electrical Equipment  -1.031**  -1.107**  -1.113**  -1.211** 
 (0.033)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.013) 
Transport Equipment  -0.951**  -0.987**  -0.795**  -0.842** 
 (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.015) 
Other Manufacturing  -0.924**  -0.983**  -0.717**  -0.723** 
 (0.036)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.013) 
Electricity -1.209**  -1.511**  -0.966**  -0.839** 
 (0.053)  (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
Non-industrial -1.025**  -1.004**  -0.824**  -0.889** 
 (0.048)  (0.087)  (0.042)  (0.037)   56
Undefined     -0.949**  -1.165** 
     (0.046)  (0.074) 
Year 1993  0.196**  0.168**  -0.107  0.810** 
 (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.198)  (0.144) 
Year 1994  0.232**  0.211**  -0.290  0.563** 
 (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.198)  (0.143) 
Year 1995  0.286**  0.268**  -0.371  0.458** 
 (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.198)  (0.143) 
Year 1996  0.289**  0.277**  -0.395*  0.432** 
 (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.198)  (0.143) 
Year 1997  0.399**  0.466**  -0.350  0.519** 
 (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.198)  (0.143) 
Year 1998  0.384**  0.450**  -0.619**  0.288* 
 (0.025)  (0.042)  (0.198)  (0.143) 
Year 1999  0.451**  0.557**  -0.486*  0.468** 
 (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.198)  (0.143) 
Year 2000  0.527**  0.645**  -0.356  0.635** 
 (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.198)  (0.143) 
Constant 3.858**  5.235**  -5.797**  -7.466** 
 (0.367)  (0.241)  (0.206)  (0.219) 
No. of obs.  19,971  19,971  153,402  153,402 
No. of firms  4,657  4,657  26286  26286 
R
2 0.741  0.754  0.670  0.680 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Food industry, state 
ownership, and 1992 year are omitted categories.  In Czech data dummies for the last available quarter and for the 
number of non-missing quarters are added.  In the Russian Federation the regressions also include a dummy for 
1992 capital/output mismeasurement and a dummy for 1992 state ownership.  In both countries two additional 
dummy variables were included for data anomalies.  RE – random effects estimator.  The estimated coefficients on 
inputs of the underlying translog production function display concavity and monotonicity at the geometric mean 
values of the variables.   57
Table A5: Changes over Time in the Efficiency Gains of Foreign Firms Relative to  
Other Types of Ownership from the Quantile Estimates 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Percentile Foreign-Mixed  Foreign-Private  Foreign-State 
  95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 
0.200* -0.161** 0.038  -0.029  0.160** 0.269**  10 
(0.090) (0.048) (0.056) (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.268** -0.162**  0.085  -0.041  0.189**  0.089**  25 
(0.089) (0.053) (0.055) (0.043) (0.004) (0.005) 
0.240** -0.035  0.043  0.001  0.147**  0.018**  50 
(0.075) (0.042) (0.045) (0.032) (0.002) (0.003) 
0.226* -0.126*  0.081  -0.081*  0.160**  -0.071**  75 
(0.089) (0.053) (0.053) (0.041) (0.003) (0.005) 
0.195) 0.018  0.052 -0.049  0.081**  -0.023** 
90 
(0.113 (0.064)  (0.069)  (0.050)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
 
Russia 
 
Percentile Foreign-Mixed  Foreign-Private  Foreign-State 
  95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 
0.426** 0.195** 0.346** 0.167** 0.383** 0.100**  10 
(0.072) (0.063) (0.073) (0.063) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.335** 0.147** 0.273** 0.130** 0.380** 0.089**  25 
(0.051) (0.041) (0.052) (0.041) (0.003) (0.002) 
0.370** 0.129** 0.318** 0.108** 0.395** 0.130**  50 
(0.044) (0.034) (0.044) (0.034) (0.002) (0.001) 
0.457** 0.034  0.448**  -0.003  0.481** 0.056**  75 
(0.045) (0.032) (0.045) (0.032) (0.002) (0.001) 
0.269** -0.082  0.282** -0.150**  0.348** -0.031** 
90 
(0.059) (0.043) (0.060) (0.043) (0.004) (0.002) 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are computed by the Delta method (Greene, 2003); * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  All coefficients are significant at 5%, except two: last column first and last rows for Russia.  
The estimates of the coefficients and covariance matrices are obtained from the Chow quantile regressions of 
output on capital and labor inputs (translog specification), ownership dummies, industry dummies, and controls for 
data anomalies.     58
Table A6:  Correlation among the Alternative Measures of Productive Efficiency 
 
  Czech Republic  Russia 
  RE vs. FE  RE vs.  
2SLS-RE  RE vs. FE  RE vs.  
2SLS-RE 
1992-1994      
Overall  0.768 0.920 0.808 0.988 
Foreign  0.844 0.917 0.923 0.936 
Mixed  0.687 0.913 0.811 0.988 
Private  0.799 0.929 0.688 0.986 
State  0.731 0.910 0.820 0.990 
1995-1997      
Overall  0.753 0.994 0.815 0.995 
Foreign  0.858 0.997 0.901 0.987 
Mixed  0.674 0.995 0.828 0.997 
Private  0.748 0.995 0.763 0.995 
State  0.732 0.985 0.840 0.994 
1998-2000      
Overall  0.882 0.992 0.910 0.991 
Foreign  0.904 0.992 0.930 0.988 
Mixed  0.843 0.990 0.922 0.993 
Private  0.871 0.992 0.895 0.990 
State  0.906 0.989 0.898 0.991 
 
Notes:  The efficiency estimates are obtained from the translog production function estimated for 
each period separately.  RE – random effects estimator, FE – fixed effects estimator, and 2SLS-RE – 
two stage least squares random effect estimator.  The specification includes inputs, ownership 
dummies, industry dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.      59
Table A7: Sensitivity of the Distance Measure to the Alternative Definitions of the Frontier 
Czech Republic 
Frontier =  Top 50% Foreign Firms in Industry  Top 10% Foreign Firms in the Country  Average Foreign Firm in the Country 
Percentile Foreign Mixed Private  State  Foreign Mixed Private  State  Foreign Mixed Private  State 
1992-1994 
10  0.326 0.327 0.290 0.282 0.212 0.210 0.182 0.185 0.514 0.509 0.441 0.448 
50  0.691 0.604 0.508 0.521 0.413 0.385 0.321 0.307 0.999 0.933 0.778 0.744 
90  1.314 1.138 0.982 0.894 0.819 0.660 0.593 0.530 1.983 1.598 1.435 1.282 
1995-1997 
10  0.277 0.238 0.223 0.208 0.151 0.139 0.126 0.119 0.424 0.391 0.355 0.336 
50  0.697 0.429 0.425 0.408 0.372 0.236 0.240 0.226 1.049 0.663 0.676 0.637 
90  1.318 0.789 0.891 0.804 0.800 0.449 0.491 0.462 2.253 1.266 1.382 1.302 
1998-2000 
10  0.240 0.241 0.221 0.175 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.091 0.409 0.395 0.362 0.251 
50  0.661 0.436 0.455 0.400 0.380 0.241 0.260 0.219 1.047 0.664 0.715 0.604 
90  1.298 0.851 0.909 0.774 0.748 0.508 0.539 0.446 2.059 1.397 1.482 1.226 
Russia 
Frontier =  Top 50% Foreign Firms in Industry  Top 10% Foreign Firms in the Country  Average Foreign Firm in the Country 
Percentile Foreign Mixed Private  State  Foreign Mixed Private  State  Foreign Mixed Private  State 
1992-1994 
10  0.119 0.126 0.122 0.104 0.029 0.032 0.030 0.027 0.252 0.275 0.259 0.233 
50  0.413 0.313 0.300 0.280 0.099 0.072 0.069 0.065 0.855 0.622 0.594 0.562 
90  1.829 0.695 0.690 0.659 0.588 0.163 0.155 0.155 5.092 1.414 1.339 1.341 
1995-1997 
10  0.111 0.069 0.075 0.053 0.037 0.024 0.026 0.019 0.254 0.164 0.181 0.128 
50  0.459 0.220 0.217 0.186 0.140 0.070 0.071 0.058 0.968 0.480 0.491 0.400 
90  1.844 0.555 0.518 0.548 0.646 0.167 0.164 0.147 4.449 1.152 1.129 1.012 
1998-2000 
10  0.128 0.057 0.068 0.053 0.046 0.021 0.025 0.020 0.268 0.126 0.150 0.119 
50  0.473 0.205 0.213 0.192 0.164 0.072 0.077 0.060 0.966 0.426 0.451 0.356 
90  1.738 0.501 0.532 0.468 0.674 0.177 0.191 0.148 3.968 1.045 1.125 0.871 
 
Notes:  The efficiency estimates are obtained from the translog production function estimated with the random effect estimator for each period separately.  The 
specification includes inputs, ownership dummies, industry dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  Percentiles are constructed from the distribution 
of the firm-specific distance to the frontier for each ownership type.  For example, in Russia during the 1992-1994 period, private firms at the 50
th percentile reach only 
30% of the efficiency level of the top 50% foreign firms in a corresponding industry or 7%of the efficiency of the top 10% of all foreign firms in the country.     60
Table A8: Distribution of Efficiency by Decile, Ownership, and Period, % 
 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Deciles  1992-1994  1995-1997   1998-2000 
  State Mixed  Private  Foreign    State Mixed  Private  Foreign   State Mixed  Private Foreign 
1  50.3  1.4 44.8  3.6  21.9 12.1 58.8  7.2  5.8 11.5 61.8 21.0 
2  53.9  0.9 42.2  3.0  22.5 10.6 60.1  6.8  5.5 14.6 66.0 14.0 
3  52.3  2.0 43.0  2.7  19.7 16.5 56.7  7.1  4.6 16.5 65.0 13.9 
4  52.6  1.8 39.3  6.3  19.6 15.9 59.1  5.3  4.0 24.0 59.1 12.9 
5  54.6  1.5 39.3  4.7  19.6 15.9 54.9  9.6  1.7 17.0 62.3 19.0 
6  53.8  1.1 41.4  3.8  17.2 15.4 60.6  6.8  3.5 13.1 63.4 20.0 
7  50.2  3.6 40.9  5.3  20.5 14.8 55.2  9.6  3.4 15.1 58.2 23.4 
8  47.3  2.6 41.0  9.2  16.1 14.9 56.0 13.1  4.0 10.0 50.5 35.5 
9  44.4  2.7 45.2  7.7  15.2 10.2 54.7 19.9  1.4  9.7 47.5 41.5 
10  (Best)  35.8  3.2 45.4 15.6  11.8  7.4 45.6 35.3  0.8  9.2 38.5 51.5 
Total  49.5  2.1 42.2  6.2  18.4 13.4 56.2 12.1  3.5 14.1 57.2 25.3 
 
 
Russia 
 
Deciles  1992-1994  1995-1997   1998-2000 
  State Mixed  Private  Foreign    State Mixed  Private  Foreign    State Mixed  Private Foreign 
1    64.1 21.1 13.4  1.4  24.0 42.7 31.5  1.8  20.3 35.5 42.5  1.7 
2  61.2 22.5 15.6  0.8  20.2 42.1 36.4  1.3  20.9 31.4 45.9  1.8 
3  58.7 25.6 14.9  0.8  19.6 41.4 37.7  1.4  20.2 31.6 46.3  1.9 
4  57.6 26.8 15.0  0.7  16.3 42.7 39.5  1.5  16.3 32.1 49.7  2.0 
5  56.6 27.0 15.4  1.0  15.2 45.7 37.2  1.9  14.9 33.7 49.0  2.4 
6  54.8 28.9 15.1  1.2  14.1 43.8 40.1  2.0  14.5 32.4 49.4  3.8 
7  53.9 29.4 15.6  1.1  14.2 44.5 39.1  2.2  14.3 31.8 51.4  2.5 
8  53.4 28.6 17.0  1.0  13.8 43.6 39.8  2.9  12.7 32.3 50.8  4.1 
9  53.0 29.2 15.9  1.9  13.4 42.7 40.2  3.7  10.8 31.8 50.0  7.4 
10  (Best)  53.5 28.3 13.6  4.6  10.7 40.9 34.1 14.3  7.6 25.3 45.3 21.8 
Total  56.7 26.7 15.2  1.4  16.1 43.0 37.6  3.3  15.3 31.8 48.0  4.9 
 
Notes:  The efficiency estimates are obtained from the translog production function estimated with the random effect estimator for each period separately.  Deciles are 
constructed from the overall distribution of estimated random effects. 
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